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Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades, the world has faced more than a thousand disasters. The 
Centre for Research into the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) reported in 2016 that 
from 2005 till 2014 an annual average of 367 disasters affected 76 thousand 
humanitarian losses per year. In 2016 even more than 471 disasters were registered 
(CRED, 2016). 
 
To save as many lives as possible directly after a disaster, there has to be a very 
effective disaster relief system and organization with an effective and responsive supply 
chain. Coordination is the key for effective and efficient supply chains. In the literature, 
the focus is on the coordination during disaster relief operations in general. The 
differences between military and non-military relief organizations give challenges in 
coordination, but these are not investigated in detail. Tatham and Rietjens (2016) 
described some of the differences and challenges in coordination between military and 
non-military relief organizations. These are based on literature only and do not identify 
possible ways to improve the coordination between these organizations. Jensen and 
Hertz (2016) stated that there is (still) a very clear gap in literature on the particular 
roles that are important for coordination, and their content for humanitarian logistics 
have received very limited attention. With the increasing number of natural disasters, the 
need for coordination between the military and non-military relief organization also 
increases. Recent studies are mainly focused on coordination in general. Because of the 
little attention on the coordination between military and non-military relief organizations, 
there is a lot to win. With improving the coordination, the effective and efficient use of 
resources and the saving of precious time can save more lives. 
 
The research question is: 
“How can the coordination between the military organization and the non-military relief 
organization during disaster relief operations be improved?” 
 
To answer this research question, three sub questions need to be answered: 
1 “What are the critical success factors for coordination?”; 
2 “How does the coordination between military and non-military organizations take 
place during disaster relief operations?”; 
3 “What is the role of the military organization within disaster relief operations?”. 
 
There are several different critical success factors (csf) for coordination. Some of the csfs 
apply for the coordination during disaster relief operations. These csfs lead to 
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coordination problems between the military and non-military relief organizations. The 
analysis on these csfs are used for sub questions 2 and 3. 
 
Important for successful coordination is mutual understanding, organizational and 
cultural, between the coordinating organizations on all organizational levels. At 
operational level are less coordination problems. This led to the first proposition: 
“The focus to overcome the disconnect in mutual understanding has to be at strategic 
and tactical level”. 
 
Another cfs is clarity in the tasks and role fulfilment of organizations. The Oslo Guidelines 
state that humanitarian assistance during disaster relief operations must be provided in 
accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. But 
recent study showed that the humanitarian community is not familiar with the Oslo 
Guidelines. This led to the second proposition: 
“The unfamiliarity with the Oslo Guidelines leads to unnecessary discussions (and delay) 
between military and non-military relief organizations”. 
 
Jensen and Hertz (2016) stated that coordination between organizations is better when 
the (different) roles of these organizations are clear to each participant. They came up 
with three roles: specialist provider (clear role recognised by all and very specialised 
competences), broad provider (organization recognised and with substantial resources, 
but not very specialized) and generalist (competences are not very specialized, limited 
resources). The military organization does not fit in just either one of these roles, 
because she can take on all three. Some researchers say that the military only has to 
fulfil a logistic, supportive role which fits in the indirect assistance category of the Oslo 
Guidelines. For that reason, the third proposition is set up: 
“The military organization has only a broad provider role and delivers indirect assistance 
during disaster relief operations in the (immediate) response phase”. 
 
To validate these propositions, a single case study is performed. The subject of this case 
study is the disaster relief operation after hurricane Matthew on Haiti in October 2016. 
The focus of this case is the support of the Dutch military organization and the 
coordination with the non-military relief organizations. Several documents, the After 
Action Review of OCHA, situation updates of the Logistic Working Group and the semi-
structural interviews with the key-informants of military and non-military relief 
organizations of the different organizational levels of the involved organizations are used. 
The semi-structured interview is based on the validated questionnaire of the report on 
effectiveness of foreign military assets in natural disaster response of SIPRI (2007). 
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The case study of the disaster relief operation after hurricane Matthew showed that no 
coordination problems occurred between military and non-military relief organizations at 
operational level. At the tactical level were some challenges with the coordination 
between military and non-military relief organizations. These challenges had to do with 
the organizational and cultural differences between military and non-military relief 
organizations. At strategic level, there was a discussion between the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affair and the Ministry of Defence regarding the Oslo Guidelines. 
 
The discussion between the Dutch MoFA and the MoD concerned ambiguity about the use 
of armed military personnel during disaster relief operation. The outcome of the case 
study shows that 50% of the respondents are familiar with the Oslo Guidelines, but only 
17% acknowledge that the guidelines applies for the use of military organizations during 
disaster relief operations. This result matches with the result of the study of Vincenzo 
Bollettino (2014). The goal of the Oslo Guidelines is not reached. The mentioned 
disagreement between the Dutch MoFA and MOD led to a discussion of several days. 
During this time, extra lives of the affected population of Haiti could have been saved. 
 
One of the critical success factors of coordination is clear task and role fulfilment. There 
is no clear task and role fulfilment for the military organization during disaster relief 
operations. The military organization fulfils a specialist, but also a broad provider role 
(Jensen and Hertz, 2016). With their (organizational) capacities, the military can provide 
direct, indirect assistance and also infrastructure support.  
 
To improve the coordination between the military and the non-military relief 
organizations, more attention must be paid to get mutual understanding on tactical and 
strategic level between these organizations.  
Besides that, the military organizations must have a clear role during disaster relief 
organizations. To improve the coordination there has to be familiarity and clarity on the 
Oslo Guidelines and the military organization has to accept that it has no leading but an 
assistance role during disaster relief operations. The difficulty for a clear task and role 
fulfilment, is that the military organization can have a direct or indirect assistance role. 
The focus has to be on coordination before the concerning disaster relief operation to 
clarify the role of the military organizations. 
 
These improvements will reduce coordination challenges and lead to fewer discussions. 
Fewer discussions saves more lives.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1.1 Background 
Every day, the headlines of the newspapers mention the loss of lives by disasters. If not 
by terror attacks, then by natural disasters like earthquakes or floods. At this moment, 
the people in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and other African countries in that region 
suffer from drought. Also hurricane Matthew caused more than one thousand lost lives in 
the beginning of October 2016.  
 
In the past two decades, the world has faced more than a thousand disasters. The Centre 
for Research into the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) reported in 2016 that from 2005 
till 2014 an annual average of 367 disasters affected 76 thousand humanitarian losses 
per year. In 2016 even more than 471 disasters were registered (CRED, 2016). Based on 
the observed upward trend in the last hundred years, natural disasters are expected to 
increase fivefold in the next 40 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).  
 
The last years, the number of actors during disaster relief operations increased to several 
hundreds of different organizations (Van Wassenhove, 2006). The increased number of 
actors lead to the need of more coordination. 
 
In general, there has been a lot of criticism on the disaster relief community for its lack 
of coordination (McLachlin and Larson, 2011). Relief organizations tend to work 
separately, in spite of common goals (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Tatham and 
Houghton (2011) described this as one of the ‘wicked problems’ of humanitarian logistics, 
referring to decisions with multiple requirements and stakeholders where there is no 
agreement on the solution or even what the problem itself consists of.  
 
Disaster relief can even be characterised as a competitive environment. Within a disaster 
relief setting, (humanitarian) relief organizations may simultaneously coordinate and 
compete with each other. Humanitarian relief organizations compete over donors, 
resources, media attention and local networks, which discourages them to invest in 
coordinative efforts. Especially if they have their own unrestricted funding resources, are 
independently governed, or there are no incentives for them to coordinate with other 
actors (Altay and Labonte, 2014; Hicks and Pappas, 2006).  
 
Despite the fact that military organizations are always taking part in a disaster relief 
operation (always the national military organization, but often also foreign military 
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organizations), they are seen as outsiders. This may be caused by the fact that they are 
not always the perfect partners for the (humanitarian) relief organizations. The difference 
in origin, cultural and political nature of these organizations poses potential problems in 
coordination (van Wassenhove, 2006). 
 
Fortunately, the number of studies on coordination in the field of humanitarian and 
disaster relief is increasing. Several studies tried to find a way to maximize effective and 
efficient coordination between the organizations. Schulz and Blecken (2010) described 
horizontal cooperation between humanitarian organizations, Jahre and Jensen (2010) 
described coordination in humanitarian logistics through clusters and Ganguly and Rai 
(2016) described managing the humanitarian relief chain. Jensen and Hertz (2016) 
stated that coordination between organizations works better when the (different) roles of 
these organizations are clear to all the participants.  
 
However little attention is paid to the coordination between military and non-military 
relief organization during disaster relief operations (Rietjens, et al, 2008; Fernandez and 
Suthikarnnarunai, 2011;Barber, 2012; Heaslip and Barber, 2014;Tatham and Rietjens, 
2016). 
 
1.1.2 Research gap 
The main goal of a (humanitarian) supply chain in the response phase of a disaster is to 
respond in an agile manner to save as many lives as possible and to ease the suffering of 
vulnerable people. In order to mitigate the impact of a natural disaster, effective and 
efficient logistics preparation and response are needed (Tatham & Houghton, 2011). To 
reach this goal, the logistical effort of both military and non-military relief organizations 
needs to be coordinated (Fernandez & Suthikarnnarunal, 2011). The response 
increasingly requires coordination and task specialization between (humanitarian) relief 
organizations, as well as coordination with and between the military, governments and 
private businesses (van Wassenhove, 2006). When providing relief for the same disaster, 
it is important to look at where and how to separate their logistics related tasks 
(Fernandez & Suthikarnnarunal, 2011). 
 
Coordination is the key for effective and efficient supply chains, also during disaster relief 
operations. In the literature, the focus is on the coordination during disaster relief 
operations in general. The differences between military and non-military relief 
organizations gives challenges in the coordination, but these challenges are not 
investigated in detail. Tatham and Rietjens (2016) described some of the differences and 
challenges in coordination between military and non-military relief organizations. These 
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challenges are based on literature only and do not identify possible ways to improve the 
coordination between these organizations. Jensen and Hertz (2016) stated that there is 
(still) a very clear gap in literature on the particular roles that are important for 
coordination, and their content for humanitarian logistics have received very limited 
attention. With the increasing number of natural disasters, the need for coordination 
between the military and non-military relief organization also increases. Recent studies 
are mainly focused on coordination in general. Because of the little attention on the 
coordination between military and non-military relief organizations, there is a lot to win. 
With improving the coordination, the effective and efficient use of resources and the 
saving of precious time can save more lives. 
 
1.2 Problem definition, research goal and chapter outline 
1.2.1 Problem definition 
After the occurrence of a (humanitarian) disaster, the affected country can request the 
UN, the EU and/or other countries for assistance. This assistance can, and in most of the 
cases will, be executed by (foreign) military and non-military (humanitarian) disaster 
relief organizations. Their main objective is to save as many lives as possible after a 
disaster. For an effective and efficient disaster relief operation, these different 
organizations must work and coordinate with each other on every (organizational) level. 
Between military and non-military relief organization, the coordination is not optimal 
what leads to ambiguity and is time consuming. In disaster relief operations this means 
losses of lives. 
 
1.2.2 Research question and sub questions 
The problem definition leads to the next research question: 
Research question: 
 
“How can the coordination between the military organization and the non-military relief 
organization during disaster relief operations be improved?” 
 
In order to answer the main research question, three sub questions need to be answered: 
 
1 “What are the critical success factors for coordination?” 
2 “How does the coordination between military organizations and non-military 
organizations take place during disaster relief operations?” 
3 “What is the role of the military organization within disaster relief operations?” 
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Different types of investigation are used to answer the three sub questions (table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Types of research for sub questions 
 
1.2.3 Chapter outline 
Chapter two starts with a literature review for the context of disaster relief operations. 
Chapter three describes the methodology of this research and chapter four shows the 
results of the case study of hurricane Matthew on Haiti. The discussion, conclusions and 
recommendations of this thesis can be found in chapter five. 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis outline  
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Disasters and humanitarian logistics 
2.1.1 General 
This paragraph gives insight in the context of the (humanitarian) disaster relief 
‘playground’. 
 
2.1.2 Disasters 
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) describes a disaster as “a 
serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the 
affected community or society to cope using its own resources” (UN/ISDR, 2004, p.17). 
There are several types of disasters. Table 2.1 shows the mainly used categorization 
from Van Wassenhove (2006). 
 
 
Table 2.1 Types of disaster by van Wassenhove (2006) 
This research will focus on ‘sudden-onset natural disasters’. The time before, during and 
after the occurrence of a disaster can be divided in different phases. 
The common used model for emergency management consists of four main phases: 
 Mitigation phase: all the actions to avoid a disaster, reduce the probability of its 
occurrence, or diminish its destructive consequences; 
 Preparedness phase: the activities and plans before the disaster; 
 (immediate) Response phase: all the activities facing the primary consequences of 
a disaster, like the activities to save lives; 
 Recovery phase: all the activities after facing the primary consequences of a 
disaster in order to return to stability (the aftermath). 
(Altay and Green, 2006; Leiras et al, 2014; Ahmadi et al, 2015) 
 
In this paper, only the preparedness, response and recovery phase will be taken into 
account. Mitigation phase is out of the scope, because the military organization is not an 
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actor in this phase. The main focus will be on the (immediate) response phase, but it is 
necessary to take the other two phases into account for an overall view. 
 
Some researchers are convinced that the key to successful disaster response lies in the 
preparedness phase (Kováçs and Spens, 2007; Pettit and Beresford, 2009). In this phase 
there is time to reach agreements for the actual (humanitarian) relief operations. The 
preparedness phase is the start of the coordination between the different organizations. 
 
The (immediate) response phase is focused on saving lives and preventing further 
damage, its aim is to provide immediate assistance to maintain life, improve health and 
support the morale of the affected population (Eriksson, 2009). In this phase the focus in 
the supply chain is on effectivity and rapid response. To be effective in the phase directly 
after the occurrence of a disaster, it is crucial for all the involved (humanitarian) relief 
organizations to coordinate with each other. 
 
In the recovery phase the focus shifts from speed to cost reduction, with reconstruction’s 
objective being “cost saved means more lives helped” (Cozzolino et al, 2012, p. 21). 
Efficiency in the supply chain is the main objective in this phase. 
 
The problem is, that it is not always obvious in which stage of the emergency 
management phase a disaster organizations are operating. Each organization may assess 
this differently and thus there may be genuine disagreements about priorities. This 
makes the transitions between the phases particularly contentious and difficult. And it is 
the transition between the different phases and the mobilisation and disbanding of 
resources that are critical in making the relief effort as a whole a success. 
 
2.1.3 International disaster relief assistance (IDRA) and characteristics 
In the NATO doctrine, Humanitarian Assistance is defined “As part of an operation, the 
use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil 
actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling 
their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering” (AAP-06, 2013). 
 
Tathem and Rietjens (2016) stated that there needs to be a clear and unambiguous 
acceptance by military forces of the difficulties that their very presence may cause to 
some humanitarian organizations (HOs). In that perspective, the military should avoid 
the use of the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ and instead employing the Oslo Guidelines’ 
terminology of ‘international disaster relief assistance’ (IDRA). 
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To many humanitarian organizations, the definition of logistics is open for different 
interpretations. The Fritz Institute defined it as ‘the process of planning, implementing 
and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow of and storage of goods and materials as 
well as related information, from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose 
of meeting the end beneficiary’s requirements (Thomas and Mizushima, 2005, p. 60). 
In this definition, the focus is on the efficiency. As mentioned in paragraph 2.1.1, the 
focus with immediate response has to be on saving lives. Thus, on minimizing response 
time in order to reduce human suffering at almost any monetary cost (van Wassenhove, 
2006). 
 
Disaster relief operations often have to be carried out in an environment with 
destabilized infrastructure, caused by sudden-onset disasters. The relief is related to the 
provision of emergency food, shelter and service in the immediate response to a natural 
disaster (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Responding to a sudden-onset disaster requires 
an agile supply chain, thus focusing on response time instead of cost efficiencies (Kováçs 
and Spens, 2009; Akthar et al, 2012; Rutner et al, 2012). 
 
The literature frequently highlights that commonalities exist between military and 
humanitarian logistics: both have dynamic and uncertain demand patterns, face 
difficulties due to degradation of the local physical infrastructure as well as to the 
absence of certain governmental functions, attend injured and traumatised victims and 
are in constant observation of the media (Balcik et al, 2010; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; 
Tatham and Pettit, 2010; Day et al, 2012; Chakravarty, 2014). 
 
An important characteristic of the international disaster relief supply chain is the number 
of involved (humanitarian) relief organizations. The perceived wisdom is that a 
coordination strategy has much to offer and that, within this approach, the ability to 
achieve dialogue is key (Tatham and Houston, 2011). 
 
2.1.4 Actors in the disaster relief community 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, many stakeholders are involved in 
(humanitarian) disaster relief operations. This includes large numbers of uncoordinated 
and disparate donors, the media, governments, military organizations, (humanitarian) 
relief and aid organizations and the affected people (see figure 2.1).  
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At any time, there can be as many as 
several hundred (humanitarian) disaster 
relief organizations (including military 
organizations) at the scene of a disaster 
(van Wassenhove, 2006). This makes the 
coordination during the different phases of 
the disaster relief operation a big challenge. 
 
       Figure 2.1 Actors in disaster relief operations 
In this paper, the focus is on the coordination between military and non-military relief 
organizations. The non-military relief organizations meaning all the other actors besides 
the military organizations such as the (international) governmental organizations 
((i)GOs), the (international) non-governmental organizations ((i)NGOs), the media and 
last but not least the affected population. 
 
2.2 The critical success factors for coordination 
2.2.1 General 
Within literature, the use of the words coordination, cooperation and collaboration is 
mixed up. This paragraph explains the difference and also describes the critical success 
factors for coordination. 
 
2.2.2 Difference between coordination, collaboration and cooperation 
Cooperation is a voluntarily arrangement in which two or more entities engage in a 
mutually beneficial exchange instead of competing. Collaboration is a cooperative 
arrangement working towards a common goal. And coordination is a binding agreement 
between two or more entities (Businessdictionary). 
 
There are different degrees of coordination among stakeholders involved in humanitarian 
relief effort (Akhtar et al, 2012; Leiras et al, 2014). A collaborative relationship between 
stakeholders is termed as “centralised coordination”, while low collaboration or no 
collaboration and individual approaches are considered to be “decentralised coordination”. 
Following this explanation, coordination and collaboration are interchangeable.  
 
The UN and NATO’s understanding of cooperation and coordination seem to be reversed, 
because in the NATO context, cooperation is understood to imply a less binding 
relationship than coordination (just like the businessdictionary) (NATO, 2004).  
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To avoid a discussion on the use of the words coordination, collaboration or cooperation, 
this paper uses coordination: ‘Coordination’ embraces all possible forms of inter-
organizational interaction that are rooted in common intentions and lead, via negotiation, 
to agreements whereby the partners are and remain legally, and with certain restrictions, 
economically independent (Woratschek and Roth, 2005). 
 
2.2.3 The critical success factors for coordination 
Coordination takes places on different levels and between different entities. Vroemen 
(2009) states that in general, there are six critical success factors for good coordination 
and teamwork: 
 Clear goals (why is the coordination important and has to be in place?); 
 Joint (common) responsibility; 
 Open communication (including sharing of information about security); 
 Mutual respect (trust and appreciate each other); 
 Flexibility and adaptability (be responsive to new possibilities and creative in 
handling threats); 
 Show initiative (including unsolicited advice and suggestions).  
 
De Rooij (2006) builds his theory on five elements of coordination (between 
organizations): 
 Motive (the incentive for coordination); 
 Capability (the bundling of forces); 
 Task (the task or tasks and the role of the organization within the partnership to 
accomplish the goal jointly); 
 Commonality (the feeling that organizations are mutually connected); 
 Manifestation (the visibility of what the coordination will achieve). 
 
Nolte et al (2012) states that drivers for network coordination within disaster relief 
operations are incentives and equality. The analysis showed that common incentives 
(exchange mechanisms of information sharing, goods and service, best practices and/or 
personnel) and high equality among network members had a strong impact on network 
coordination (Nolte et al, 2012). 
 
All these theories and categorization of influences on coordination have a few elements in 
common. For this paper, the focus is on the coordination between two different 
organizations with different cultures and organizational values. The critical success 
factors for coordination have to overcome the differences between these two 
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organization. The critical success factors that are in common with all the different 
definitions are: 
 Clear goal; 
 Incentive for the coordination; 
 Open and equal communication (equal collocutors and common language); 
 Mutual respect on all aspects (culture and organization values); 
 Clear task and role fulfilment.  
With these critical success factors in mind, the next paragraph considers the coordination 
between military and non-military organizations during disaster relief operations. 
Paragraph 2.4 focuses on the role of the military organization during these operations. 
 
2.3 The coordination between military and non-military 
organizations during disaster relief operations 
2.3.1 General 
The debate should not be on ‘if’ but rather on ‘how’ civil and military people, processes, 
and technology can be brought together to achieve the best effect towards that all 
important final clause of the Thomas and Mizushima (2005, p. 60) definition: “for the 
purpose of meeting the end beneficiary’s requirements”. 
 
2.3.2 Coordination of disaster relief operations 
To prevent lack of inter-organizational coordination, the concept of coordination has to be 
researched and defined. Coordination is an essential tool in obtaining the big picture in 
case of an emergency. Two sub-categories of the main concept of coordination are 
frequently referred to vertical and horizontal coordination. While vertical cooperation 
involves different actors along the value chain of one industry, such as suppliers, 
manufacturers, distribution centres and customers, horizontal cooperation takes place 
between entities operating at the same level in the market (Schulz and Blecken, 2010). 
 
The clear need for inter-organizational coordination led to the establishment of topical 
clusters. In this cluster concept, vertical and horizontal coordination are integrated. 
The concept of coordination in humanitarian logistics through clusters proposed by Jahre 
and Jensen (2010) is a different approach to minimize the consequences of a natural 
disaster. The cluster concept involves organizing (humanitarian) help based on a number 
of sectors with a predefined management. Clusters were introduced to improve the 
effectiveness of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) system in 
the five following key areas: 
 Satisfactory global capacity to react to current and future crisis; 
 Trustworthy and predictable leadership at a global and local level; 
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 Unbreakable alliances between UN bodies, (i)NGOs and local authorities; 
 Responsibility, both for the reaction and in relation to receivers; 
 Strategic field-level organization and prioritization. 
 
Three main aspects are essential for the cluster system: selected global direction, central 
and local competence construction and suppliers of last alternative. 
 
The cluster concept is based on a global perspective and then customized for a particular 
location while the event occurs. Each global cluster is constant, permanent and directed 
by one assigned group. As one cluster is permanent and organized from a global 
perspective, it offers a large flexibility in its response to the incident. 
The global management of the clusters has a special task of creating both central and 
local competence. The global cluster management has a vital role in creating competence 
on a global level and the coordination between different small or large areas of 
assistance. 
The supplier of last alternative is another important part of the cluster system. According 
to this concept, the last alternative provider commits to supplying any necessary service, 
when all other organizations are not able to. It is a large responsibility because, the last 
alternative provider takes on a leading position with timeless commitments, without the 
resources to meet them. 
 
The cluster concept is built on different clusters. These different clusters are: agriculture, 
camp coordination and management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, 
emergency communication, health, logistics, nutrition, protection and water, sanitation 
and hygiene (WASH). 
 
The basics for complex disaster relief coordination are the elements communicate, 
coordinate and information sharing. The different stakeholders have different 
understandings of these elements (Bjerge et al., 2016). These elements are the main 
activities for the cluster system. There is danger that coordination will be focused on 
within-cluster coordination, and primarily at the operational level with some efforts at the 
strategic level through the global cluster lead (Jahre and Jensen, 2010). 
 
Within the cluster system the logistics cluster is responsible for preparedness (including 
stockpiling) and emergency response with regard to logistics coordination. The global 
lead for the cluster is the World Food Programme (WFP). As a service cluster, logistics 
must not only determine the needs of organizations that concentrate on logistics but 
must also serve the other clusters in their logistics. 
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2.3.3 Coordination between military and non-military organizations during disaster relief 
operations 
Coordination happens at three levels: operational, tactical and strategic, which can be 
related to respectively local, region and global level. These levels are important for any 
disaster relief operation because it proved to be inefficient to centralise operations 
completely to the global level, and because regional organizations and transportation are 
necessary when global supply chains are too slow (Schulz and Heigh, 2009). Leiras et al 
(2014) related operational, tactical and strategic decisions in humanitarian supply chains 
as short-term, medium-term and long-term decisions, respectively. 
 
The lack of coordination among (humanitarian) relief organizations was seen as a big 
challenge (Kaba, 2007; Osei-Akom, 2007), especially on strategic and tactical level. 
Coordination on operational level between military and non-military relief organizations 
seems to be more common (Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Listou, 2011; Rutner et al, 2012; 
Jensen and Hertz, 2016). During (humanitarian) relief operations, strongly motivated 
people in both camps (i.e. civil and military) usually find ways to surmount barriers that 
they encounter, but valuable time is lost inventing and reinventing these solutions 
(Heaslip and Barber, 2014). 
 
Kaba (2007) and Osei-Akom (2007) state that the coordination is hampered by the lack 
of knowledge about each other. (humanitarian) Relief organizations live by their 
principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. In other words, they will help 
everybody in need wherever found; will not influence the outcome of a conflict with their 
intervention; and will not favour one group of beneficiaries over another. These principles 
define the ‘space’ (figure 2.3), both physically and virtually, in which they need to be 
able to operate to do their job effectively (Van Wassenhove, 2006). 
Figure 2.2 'Humanitarian space' 
Military organizations are political assets. With the decision to deploy the military, she 
takes part in the operation and can’t be neutral. Another problem for the (humanitarian) 
relief organization is that a military organization may and can use weapons to reach the 
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political goals, within the rules of the military law on warfare. Despite these rules, the 
use of weapons can be seen as an act of inhumanity.  
 
One of the biggest challenges for coordination between military and non-military 
organizations lies in the different culture (Schulz and Blecken, 2010; Rietjens et al, 2007; 
Balcik et al, 2010; Heaslip et al, 2012). This challenge for coordination has to do with the 
mutual respect on all aspects, one of the critical success factors of coordination. The 
cultural and organizational differences and the lack of knowledge about each other, leads 
to a disconnect in mutual respect. 
 
2.3.4 Proposition 
In the previous paragraph is mentioned that the coordination between military and non-
military organizations are most common at operational level. 
And the differences between the military and non-military organizations, such as 
different leading principles, cultural and organizational, and the lack of knowledge about 
each other, lead to a disconnect in mutual respect. The disconnect in mutual 
understanding between the military and non-military relief organizations leads to 
challenges on strategic and tactical level, and less on operational level. For further 
research, this led to the following proposition: 
“The focus to overcome the disconnect in mutual understanding has to be on strategic 
and tactical level”. 
 
2.4 The role of military organizations during disaster relief 
operations 
2.4.1 General 
The advantages of clear roles are great in an emergency relief setting where time is at a 
premium and the constellation of actors must start to work together quickly in each new 
disaster (Tatham and Kovacs, 2010). The great advantage of such a system is that 
actors playing the same role are to a certain extent interchangeable. This reduces the 
amount of coordination needed greatly since knowing what role an actor fulfils provides 
clarity (Jensen and Hertz, 2016). But within IDRA, a consistent role framework to define 
how different actors relate to each other is lacking. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Oslo guidelines 
The Oslo Guidelines, which originate in 1992, were updated in 2006. These are guidelines 
on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief. The aim of the 
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Oslo Guidelines is to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in IDRA. 
For the purpose of the Oslo Guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories 
based on the degree of contact with the affected population.  
 Direct assistance: is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services; 
 Indirect assistance: is at least one step removed from the population and involves 
such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel; 
 Infrastructure support: involves providing general services, such as road repair, 
airspace management and power generation that facilitates relief, but are not 
necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population. 
 
The Oslo Guidelines state that humanitarian assistance (and in non-conflict disaster also 
IDRA) must be provided in accordance with the humanitarian principles (humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality). 
Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief 
mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to 
the acknowledged “humanitarian gap”. The military and civil defence assets should be 
employed as a last resort, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian 
alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required (OCHA, 2007). 
 
Despite humanitarian perceptions of effective coordination, the humanitarian community 
is not very familiar with the Oslo Guidelines. Vincenzo Bollettino (2014) concluded in his 
study that only 12% of the respondents thought that the Oslo Guidelines were used to 
develop organizational policy on humanitarian aid agency engagement with military 
actors. Even when the Oslo Guidelines are familiar, they can lead to a different view on 
the principles of fulfilling the ‘humanitarian gap’. This is not in line with the success 
factors for coordination (clear task and role fulfilment), and lead to challenges and 
discussions. With this knowledge, the following proposition is set up: 
“The unfamiliarity with the Oslo Guidelines lead to unnecessary discussions (and delay) 
between military and non-military relief organizations”. 
 
2.4.3 The concept of roles between military and non-military organizations in disaster 
relief operations 
Jensen and Hertz (2016) have set-up a concept of roles in the humanitarian community. 
They identified three main role categories: 
 Specialist provider, clear role recognised by all and very specialised competence; 
 Broad provider, organization recognised and with substantial resources, but not 
very specialised; 
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 Generalist, competence is not very specialised, limited resources. 
 
This concept of roles can be seen as a first level of organising the (humanitarian) relief 
supply chain, thus avoiding some of the basic need for coordination when time is most 
pressing (Jensen and Hertz, 2016). Within this concept of roles, it is not clear which role 
the military organization has to fulfil. With their capabilities and resources, the military 
fits in the specialist, but also in the broad provider role. 
 
In the international field of the humanitarian community, there are different opinions on 
the role of the military organization during disaster relief operations. Military forces often 
play an important role in providing support during disaster due to their strength in 
logistical and organizational structure (Apte, 2009; Barber, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Heaslip 
et al., 2012). The ability to quickly establish presence in the disaster zone whilst 
delivering large volumes of relief in the hours and days following a disaster helps to 
reduce the “gap of pain” that has been described as the time between the demand for aid 
and the time in which the aid is provided (Rietjens et al, 2008; Barber, 2010; Heaslip, 
2011). This is why Thompson (2010) and Tatham and Rietjens (2016) state that the 
military organization has a specific role in the assistance in support of logistic activities in 
the (immediate) response phase. This fits most in the indirect assistance category of the 
Oslo Guidelines. 
 
Barber (2012) identified more roles and tasks for the military organization in disaster 
relief operations in the (immediate) response phase, especially for military logisticians. 
The military logisticians can provide security missions, opening up transport and storage 
facilities, they can command and control distribution within and into disaster areas, 
restore communication systems and provide protection for incoming aid and assist with 
urgent air lifts and drops of aid in inaccessible locations. This is more specialised and fits 
in the direct and indirect assistance category of the Oslo Guidelines. 
Military personnel and equipment are also well suited to provide first stage engineering 
works to re-establish basic infrastructure including road clearance, bridge repairs, sea 
port and airport and tarmac clearance, site clearance of mines and any other potentially 
dangerous munitions. This assistance falls in the category of infrastructure support and 
within the specialist provider role. 
 
Military movements into the humanitarian space raise significant issues of principle 
(Barber, 2012). The seemingly increasing involvement of the military in IDRA is viewed 
by many in the humanitarian community as potentially jeopardizing “humanitarian space” 
freedom and access for humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality 
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(SIPRI, 2009). The importance, and difficulty, of maintaining humanitarian space is 
particularly acute in countries that are experiencing conflict or political instability (SIPRI, 
2009). There needs to be clear recognition among the military forces that, particularly in 
the light of the sensitivities surrounding their activities, they are likely to be most 
appropriately engaged in the delivery of equipment, personnel, and stores into a country 
and internally up to the disaster-affected locations rather than in ‘last-mile’ deliveries 
(Tatham and Rietjens, 2016). Thus indirect assistance and the broad provider role. 
 
Military actors are increasingly expanding their role in the recovery phase and adapting 
this in their doctrines (Barber, 2012). But there is no doubt that, in many instances, the 
real cost of the use of military personnel and/or equipment exceeds that of a civilian 
comparator. There are multiple reasons for this, such as expensive military equipment 
and the need to recruit, train, and retain personnel with a particular skill set (Paschal, 
2012). In the recovery phase, where the disaster relief operation tends to be efficient to 
save costs that will help save more lives, this has to be avoided. 
 
The opinion about the role of the military organizations during disaster relief operations 
differs from specialist to broad provider (Jensen and Hertz, 2016) and in delivering direct, 
indirect assistance and even infrastructure support (Oslo Guidelines, 2006). With the 
‘humanitarian principles’ in mind, the following proposition is set up: 
“The military organization has only a broad provider role and delivers indirect assistance 
during disaster relief operations in the (immediate) response phase”. 
 
2.5 Following steps 
The three propositions on coordination between military and non-military organizations 
and the role of the military organizations during disaster relief operations are validated in 
the case study of hurricane Matthew.
 
Figure 2.3 Thesis concept  
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3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This research is a case study of the disaster relief operation in the (immediate) response 
phase of hurricane Matthew. To give insight in the coordination challenges between 
military and non-military relief organizations, this case study started with a literature 
review. This showed the context of disaster relief operations and resulted in three 
propositions. To validate these propositions and to give answer on the qualitative 
research question, all the relevant information of the disaster relief operation and the 
answers of the semi-structured interview are collected and analysed. This chapter 
describes the methodology of the validation of the propositions. This research gives 
insight in the coordination problems between the military and non-military relief 
organizations during disaster relief operations. To give this insight, a literature review 
and a single explanatory case study of the hurricane Matthew in Haiti are conducted. The 
literature resulted in three propositions. 
 
This chapter describes the methodology that is used to test these propositions with the 
reality of the disaster relief operations in Haiti.  
 
3.2 Case study of hurricane Matthew in Haiti  
The research question of this case study, “How can the coordination between the military 
organization and the non-military organization during disaster relief operations be 
improved to save more lives?” implies a qualitative analysis. Because of the qualitative 
nature of this research and the focus on links or relations between different factors, a 
single holistic exploratory case study (Yin, 2013) is performed. This research tries to 
explore the factors that lead to the coordination problems and challenges between the 
military and non-military relief organizations during disaster relief operations. These 
problems and challenges lead to extra time for coordination, and this means less time to 
save lives or even the loss of lives.  
 
The literature review gave insight in the context of coordination. This led to critical 
success factors for coordination (first sub question). These critical success factors gave 
the focus for the analysis of the problems and challenges with coordination between 
military and non-military relief organizations (second sub question) and the analysis of 
the role of the military organization (third sub question) during disaster relief 
organizations. These analyses led to three propositions. 
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Hurricane Matthew in Haiti is a unique and representative case for the validation of the 
propositions. For the validation, a single exploratory case study of the disaster relief 
operation in the (immediate) response phase of Matthew is performed. Hurricane 
Matthew is a sudden-onset natural made disaster. During this case study, the disaster 
relief operation of hurricane Matthew is the most recent (sudden-onset natural made) 
disaster relief operations with a completed After Action Review of OCHA. During this 
disaster relief operation, different military and non-military relief organizations were 
present and active. For the analysis of this case study, multiple sources are used to 
increase the construct validity of this case study (Yin, 2009, 2013). 
 
The case study starts with a chronological overview of actions during the disaster relief 
operation of Matthew. This information is obtained from the semi-structured interviews,  
journals, situation updates from the Logistic Working Group, ECHO crisis FLASH, and the 
AAR of OCHA. This resulted in the timeline of the disaster relief operations. 
 
After the chronological overview, the coordination forums are presented. These 
coordination forums on the different organizational levels during the disaster relief 
operation of hurricane Matthew shows the different communication lines. This gives 
insight in the coordination challenges and problems between the military and non-
military relief organizations. To validate the first proposition, the coordination forums are 
divided per different organizational level. The information for these coordination forums 
is retrieved from the journals, the situation updates, the AAR and the semi-structured 
interviews. To get an objective and realistic view on the coordination lines on the 
different organizational levels and coordination challenges and problems, the interviews 
are conducted with more than one key-informant per organizational level and from a 
different military unit or non-military relief organization. To validate the first proposition, 
the questionnaire consists of a category ‘coordination’. But also other information, such 
as effectiveness and efficiency, are used to get an clear picture on the first proposition.  
 
To validate the second proposition, the questions on the Oslo Guidelines in the 
questionnaire are used. Also the information about the timeline and the questions in the 
questionnaire on efficiency gave insight on eventually delay caused by the unfamiliarity 
with the Oslo Guidelines.  
 
The third proposition, the role of the military organizations during disaster relief 
operations, is validated with the information retrieved from the questionnaire and from 
the AAR and the journals. The results are based on objective information from the AAR 
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and journals, but also on the open question on the role of the military organizations 
during disaster relief operations for the key-informants.  
 
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
3.2.1.1 Purpose of the interview 
The purpose of these interviews was to gain insight in the coordination challenges and 
problems between the Dutch military forces and the involved non-military organizations 
and the role of the Dutch military forces during the disaster relief operation in Haiti. This 
resulted in a chronological overview of the actions, the procedures that are followed and 
the coordination between the Dutch military forces and the non-military relief 
organizations on all levels (strategic, tactical and operational level). The information 
gathered via these interviews contribute to a better overall understanding of the 
relationship between military forces and non-military relief organizations and gives an 
indication of the possible struggles in coordination during disaster relief operations. 
Besides that, it explores the familiarity with the Oslo Guidelines and shows the role of the 
military organizations during disaster relief operations in Haiti. 
 
3.2.1.2 Important aspects that can influence the outcome of an interview 
The answers of the interviewees can be, and certainly are, subjective opinions and 
observations of the situation. These might lead to less objective results. To minimize this 
risk, the interviewer repeated the answers on the questions so the interviewee heard 
their own answers. With this, they could reconsider their answers. A transcript of the 
interview is also send to the interviewee. That gave them the possibility to react on the 
transcript and the specific answers they wanted to change. 
 
3.2.1.3 Preparation 
The literature review is the foundation for this research. The literature review gave the 
focus for the case study on the research question. The questionnaire for this research is 
based on the questionnaire that is used for the report by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2007). This is a report on the effectiveness of foreign 
military assets in natural disaster response. The questions in the questionnaire are based 
on the six (interconnected) aspects of effectiveness. This validated questionnaire is also 
used by Van Schoorl (2010) for his case study on natural disaster response in urban 
context.  
Besides the fact that the questions for the interviews are based on a validated 
questionnaire, the interview questions are also validated with other objective persons 
(peer researchers) to make sure that the questions deliver the answers needed for this 
case study and that the interviews are representative for this research. 
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3.2.1.4 Key-informants 
To gather information about the coordination challenges between the Dutch military 
forces and the non-military relief organizations, information about the familiarity with the 
Oslo Guidelines and the role of the military organizations during disaster relief operations, 
the key-informants of present and active organizations during the disaster relief 
operation of Matthew are interviewed. The key-informant represents the Dutch military 
forces (Ministry of Defence), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN OCHA, UNDAC, EU 
ECHO and some of the biggest iNGOs (International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), 
OXFAM NOVIB and CORDAID (part of Caritas Internationalis)). A total of twelve persons 
have answered the questionnaire. Seven interviews are conducted (four interviews face 
to face, two with FaceTime and one by telephone). The transcripts from the two 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are merged into one. The other five 
respondents completed the questionnaire on paper and they are contacted when any 
questions raised by their answers. The key-informants can be divided in several 
categories. First, they can be divided in military (five persons) and non-military disaster 
relief organizations (seven persons). Second, they can be divided in the different 
organization levels; strategic level (four persons), tactical level (seven persons) and 
operational level (four persons). The sum of these representatives is above twelve, but 
the reason for that is that some of the representatives were active on different 
organizational levels during the disaster relief operation of Matthew. The answers of the 
representatives are also cross-checked to obtain an objective view on the different 
propositions.  
 
3.2.1.5 Reliability and validity 
To increase the reliability, validity and transparency of this case study, all the procedures 
and data of this research are well documented and stored to ensure that the results of 
this case are replicable. All the data and the transcripts of the interviews are in the 
annexes.  
 
3.3 Research model 
Hurricane Matthew, that made landfall on Haiti on the 4th of October 2016, is the main 
case of this study. The coordination between the military and non-military relief 
organizations during the disaster relief operation is analysed. This case does not only 
focus on the coordination between the different organizations, but also on different 
organizational levels (strategic, tactical and operational level). During the disaster relief 
operation of hurricane Matthew, the Dutch military organization supported Haiti and the 
international relief operation by sending two Dutch Royal Navy ships. These ships 
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delivered logistics (transport capacity and relief goods) support, security and 
infrastructure repair capacity. The non-military relief organizations in scope of this case 
are CORDAID, Oxfam Novib, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), the 
UN OCHA, the EU ECHO and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Three sub questions were defined in order to answer the research question. Within the 
literature review, the first sub question on the critical success factors of coordination is 
answered. These critical success factors on coordination are used to form three 
propositions on the other two sub questions (the coordination between military and non-
military relief organizations and the role of the military organization during disaster relief 
operations). 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the three propositions are validated in the case study of the 
disaster relief operations of hurricane Matthew on Haiti. As mentioned before, the 
documents, which are used for this case study, are the After Action Review (AAR) of the 
disaster relief operation of hurricane Matthew from OCHA, the flash appeals (OCHA and 
ECHO) and the situation updates from the Logistic Working Group. Besides the 
documents, the results of the 
performed semi-structured interviews 
with the key-informants of the 
involved organizations within the 
disaster relief operations are used.  
 
The analysis of the case study starts 
off with a chronological overview of 
the Dutch participation during the 
disaster relief operation of hurricane 
Matthew on Haiti. The answers of the 
interviews are coded to use them for 
analysing the propositions. The 
results of the validation of the 
propositions are the starting point for 
the discussion in the literature review 
in chapter 5.  
      Figure 3.1 Research model 
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4 Case study hurricane Matthew 
 
In this chapter the case of the disaster relief operation of hurricane Matthew is studied. 
The focus is on the Dutch military organization and the non-military relief organizations 
in the logistic field. 
 
This chapter starts with a chronological overview of 
the Dutch participation during the disaster relief 
operation of hurricane Matthew on Haiti. It also 
defines the different actors on the different 
coordination levels. 
 
After the overview, this chapter presents the results 
of the case study on the proposition for coordination 
between the military and the non-military relief 
organizations. Then, the familiarity with and the 
importance of the Oslo Guidelines is described. This 
chapter ends with the results on the role of the 
military organizations within disaster relief operations.  
            
   Figure 4.1 Overview of chapter 4 
 
4.1 Case Matthew 
4.1.1 Hurricane Matthew 
Hurricane Matthew was a powerful Atlantic hurricane, category 4 on the Saffir-Simpson 
scale. The Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale is an excellent tool for alerting the public 
about the possible impacts of various intensity hurricanes. The impact of a category 4 is 
described as catastrophic damage. Long-term water shortages will increase human 
suffering and most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months. 
It was clear that Matthew would hit Haiti (and possible Jamaica), so an UNDAC team was 
sent to Haiti to assess the situation. 
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  Figure 4.2 Hurricane Matthew on Haiti 
 
On the 4th of October, Matthew hit the South Western tip of Haiti, making landfall at 
about 11:00 GMT.  
 
The maximum sustained wind was reported to equal 250 km/h. Torrential rain as well as 
mudslides were triggered by the wind, causing extensive damage in coastal areas. It also 
caused severe damage to road and ICT infrastructure, as well as housing and health 
facilities. Because of the damaged road, not all affected locations could be reached. 
 
Hurricane Matthew costed more than a thousand lives on Haiti and more than 1.4 million 
affected people required immediate assistance. The OCHA released a Haiti Flash Appeal 
of $119.9 million on the 10th of October (updated on the 19th of October), which was 
required to reach 750.000 people with life-saving assistance and protection in the next 
three months after the Flash Appeal. 
 
4.1.2 Disaster relief operation 
The disaster relief operation started before hurricane Matthew made landfall. An UNDAC 
team was already sent to Haiti before Matthew to make an assessment. On the 3rd of 
October the government of Haiti, in cooperation with the Pan-American Health 
Organization (PAHO), requested the Netherlands for support with the nearby Marine 
ships. The request was received on the 4th of October by the Netherlands. The 
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Netherlands rejected the request, because it was a bilateral and not conform the UN or 
EU procedures. Besides that, it was a specific request for the ships and not for the 
needed capacities. 
 
On the 4th of October 2016, hurricane Matthew made landfall Haiti. Directly after the 
disaster, the government of Haiti was in a state of chaos. That’s why it took a while 
before the Government of Haiti officially requested assistance of the international 
community. In line with its primary role, the Government of Haiti clearly established its 
leadership in the coordination of the international response. The UN OCHA decided to 
increase the UNDAC capacity with an extra team and ECHO sent a Civil Protection Team 
(CPT) to Haiti for coordination. UN OCHA set up a shadow cluster system. Because the 
Government of Haiti was in charge, it could not be named cluster system. It now was 
called the Sector system. The advisor of the sector logistics was the World Food Program 
(WFP) (within the UN Cluster system the leading organization for the logistic cluster). 
 
EU ECHO received a request for support from OCHA. They passed this request on to their 
members. The EU released €3.755 million (ECHO Factsheet Haiti, 17 November 2016) to 
fund emergency humanitarian assistance. Besides that, some members offered relief 
capacity for the disaster relief operation on Haiti.  
 
Because of the bilateral contacts with Haiti, the Netherlands knew that there would be a 
request for capacity to support the disaster relief operations. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MoFA) coordinated with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) about what the 
Netherlands could offer. The Netherlands offered two Navy ships with transport capacity, 
force protection and capacity for reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. Late in the 
evening of the 4th of October, the Netherlands received the request for support. This 
request had to be staffed within the Dutch government. On the 7th of October, the MoFA 
and the MoD agreed on the support for the relief operation in Haiti and they accepted the 
request. 
 
For jurisprudential reasons, there had to be bilateral arrangement between Haiti and the 
Netherlands. The MoD insisted in arming the Dutch military personnel for their own 
protection. This point of view led to a discussion with MoFA. In the Oslo Guidelines it is 
not clearly stated if armed military personnel may support disaster relief operations. In 
the end, it was decided that the military organization supported the disaster relief 
operation with armed personnel. 
The decision about the armed personnel and other arrangements (declarations of goods, 
etc.) had to be in a ‘Note Verbale’. It took several days before the ‘Note Verbale’ was 
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signed by Haiti, because they were not familiar with the right procedures. In the 
meantime, the two Navy ships moved to Haiti. But the personnel was not allowed to 
enter Haiti before the ‘Note Verbale’ was signed. This delay frustrated the personnel on 
the ships, because they wanted to help the people of Haiti. It also frustrated the local 
authorities and the non-military relief organizations, because they needed the support of 
the ships and the men. The Dutch commanders used the time to coordinate and explain 
the problems to the local authorities, representatives of the non-military relief 
organizations and the media on board of their ships. On the 11th of October, the ‘Note 
Verbale’ was signed and the two Navy ships could start with their relief support. 
 
The two Navy ships provided transport capacity for transporting goods of non-military 
relief organizations to locations that were not accessible by road. Dutch engineers also 
supported with restoring roads and repairing a hospital. Besides that, the Dutch military 
delivered capacity in examening the coastline for places safe to moor.  
 
For the coordination of the ‘last mile’ distribution, the ships had representatives of the 
local authority and representatives of the non-military relief organizations on board. 
Before the actual distribution, these representatives were in contact with their colleagues 
on shore to organize the reception of these goods. The whole process went without chaos, 
because of the coordination in advance and the support of the military personnel. 
 
There were no incidents with weapons of the Dutch armed military involved during the 
support of the relief operation. There is no direct evidence that the armed personnel 
were the success factor for the support operations, but some support operations with 
other organizations led to chaos. Some convoys were even rushed and/or ambushed by 
the local population. 
 
The Netherlands offered the support with the two ships for one week. At the end of that 
week, the Netherlands received a request for another week. This request came via the 
official channels of the EU and UN. The Netherlands complied with this request for 
prolongation with another week. There was a second request for prolongation of the two 
ships after the second week. This request was not granted by the Netherlands and for 
that reason the support came to an end on the 26th of October. 
 
The leave of the two ships resulted in a problem in the transport capacity during the 
relief operation. The US support with helicopters had already stopped. The Sector 
logistics was contracting civil transport capacity to take over the role of the Dutch ships, 
but this contract was not yet in place.  
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Figure 4.3 Timeline Dutch military relief operation 
 
4.1.3 Coordination on different organizational levels 
The first request for help was between Haiti and the Netherlands on strategical level. This 
bilateral request was rejected by the Netherlands, because it was not according to the 
official procedures. Figure 4.4 shows the official request for help procedure (formulated 
in capacity and assistance after coordination between the Haitian government and the 
Dutch MoFA). The procedure of the request for prolongation is the same. 
 Figure 4.4 Request coordination 
During the disaster relief operation, the logistic support was coordinated by the Logistic 
Working Group (LWG) from the WFP. The LWG consisted of two logistic officers, one 
cargo tracking officer, one IM officer and one Civilian-Military Coordination (CMCoord) 
officer. UN UNDAC and EU CPT’s supported the different sectors with their coordination 
capacity. The authorities of Haiti were in command. The LWG daily organized logistic 
meetings. Over 50 military and non-military relief organizations were attending these 
meetings. The Dutch military organization sent a Liaison Officer (LO) to attend these 
LWG meetings. After the arrival of the two Dutch ships in the territorial waters of Haiti, 
the LO coordinated their support for the relief operation during the LWG meetings, on 
tactical (regional) level. This coordination on tactical level is shown in figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Coordination on tactical level 
After coordination at the tactical level in the LWG meetings, the Dutch LO coordinated 
with the commanders of the Dutch Navy ships. The commanders invited the 
representatives of the supported non-military relief organizations and the local 
authorities on board to coordinate on the operational level. These representatives were in 
contact with their local counterparts, where the people in need were (figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6 Coordination on Operational level 
Figure 4.7 shows the military chain of command during the disaster relief operation of 
Matthew. The commander of the Zr. Ms. Holland was the highest in rank on location. 
After a few days, the Dutch military organization experienced that the official chain of 
command was too complex during the disaster relief operation. The Dutch LO was acting 
on operational level in the national chain of command and at the same time he was the 
point of contact on tactical level for the disaster relief operation (within the logistics 
sector). The official chain in command stayed intact, but it was up to the Dutch LO to 
coordinate with the Defence Staff (on strategical level). 
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Figure 4.7 Military chain of command during hurricane Matthew 
 
4.2 Coordination, Oslo Guidelines and role of the military 
organization in disaster relief operations 
4.2.1 Results overview 
The case study validates the three propositions. Table 4.1 shows the results of the 
respondents on the most essential questions from the semi-structured interview for 
validating the propositions. 
 
Table 4.1 Results of case study hurricane Matthew on propositions 
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4.2.2 Coordination between military and non-military relief organizations during relief 
operations 
The coordination between military and non-military organizations on the operational level 
seemed to be no problem. During the execution of the relief operations, no cultural of 
organizational problems hampered the coordination between both organizations. Menno 
van der Eerden (Commander of Zr. Ms. Holland, interview annex 7.12): “No, the 
coordination went well. In the beginning, we had to learn to know each other. But after a 
while we knew the roles of the different organizations”. Frank Jonker (Commander of the 
engineer group, interview annex 7.13): ”There wasn’t even an language barrier”. All the 
respondents on the operational level answered that the coordination between the military 
and non-military organizations was effective.  
 
The coordination challenges and problems between military and non-military relief 
organizations have been experienced on the strategic and tactical level. The non-military 
relief organizations experienced problems with the ‘humanitarian space’. Fanny de 
Swarte (EU ECHO, interview annex 7.8):” A lot of non-military relief organizations depend 
on the goodwill of the parties involved. Being perceived as a neutral party is essential for 
non-military relief organizations. There are moments your life depends on being seen as 
neutral”.  
 
There are also cultural and organizational differences that fed the disconnect in mutual 
understanding: “They can provide some support, such as heavy lift or logistics support, 
but they are not humanitarians” (Stephan MacAndrew of the IFRC, interview 7.10). 
 
The coordination challenges and problems on strategic level occurred between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. That had to do with the familiarity 
with the Oslo Guidelines. 
 
4.2.3 The Oslo Guidelines 
The Oslo Guidelines gives guidance on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets 
in disaster relief. However, in practice the Oslo Guidelines are not known and/or not used. 
Table 4.1 shows that seven of the twelve respondents (the answers from the MoFA 
consists of two respondents) are familiar with the Oslo Guidelines. This is just more than 
50%. Two respondents of the military organizations are familiar with these guidelines. 
There is not much attention for these guidelines in the military organization in 
preparation of the support during the disaster relief operation. 
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Two respondents answered that the Oslo Guidelines were leading in the coordination 
between the military and the non-military relief organizations. That means that 17% of 
the respondents used the guidelines to coordinate. Even the most non-military relief 
organization do not use these guidelines for coordination with military organizations. 
Ronald Christiaans: “The Guidelines are not leading for us. We just ask for what we want 
and the military organization decides whether they can facilitate or not.” (UN UNDAC, 
interview annex 7.7). Fanny de Swarte: “Yes, on strategic and tactical level we applied 
these guidelines. On operational level, it is pragmatically.” (EU ECHO, interview annex 
7.8). 
 
On strategic level, the Oslo Guidelines led to discussions regarding weapons. The military 
organization consisted in supporting the disaster relief operation with armed personnel. 
The lessons learned from other disaster relief operations, such as the earthquake on Haiti 
or the cyclone on Dominica: “handling aid goods and ensuring that they find their way to 
their proper destination can only take place in a secure and secured environment” 
(Houben, 2009). The respondents from the MoFA wanted that the ‘Humanitarian space’ 
was ensured. That mend in their opinion that the military organization was not allowed to 
carry any weapons during the operation. They based their opinion on the Oslo Guidelines. 
The legal advisors of the Ministry of Defence concluded that this was not an issue in the 
Oslo Guidelines. After several days of discussion, the decision was made that the military 
organization was allowed to support the disaster relief operation with armed personnel. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview, annex 7.3): “To come into action, there had to be a 
signed ‘Note Verbale’. We had the content of this letter, but the Ministry of Defence 
wanted the condition that they could operate with armed personnel during the 
emergency relief operation because of their experience during the earthquake on Haiti in 
2010. This had to be included in the ‘Note Verbale’ and that took a while.” 
Stefan Maureau (MoD, interview annex 7.4): “Gladly, we hold on to our demand to send 
our troops armed with weapons. In Haiti, convoys were ambushed, but that did not 
happen to the Dutch military organization.” 
 
In case of the disaster relief operation of Matthew it seems that armed personnel played 
a decisive role in the support. It prevented chaotic situations and looting. However the 
discussion whether it is allowed to support with armed personnel has to be concluded 
before the next disaster occurs. The request for help was received on the 4th of October, 
the support of the disaster relief operations started seven days later on the 11th of 
October. One of the main reasons for the delay was this discussion about the armed 
personnel. 
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4.2.4 The role of the military relief organizations during relief operations 
The Dutch military organization supported with transport capacity, force protection, 
engineering capacity for reconstruction of infrastructure and capacity for measurements 
of the depth of the quays. The support of the Dutch military organization was very much 
appreciated. Stefan Maureau (MoD, interview annex 7.4): “The provided help was very 
good and we received compliments from Haiti and the UN. This is a sign that the 
emergency relief was good.” 
 
Generally, the military organization is willing to take part in relief operations. Their 
capacity and speed of action can be very helpful for the immediate response to a disaster. 
But the government decides if the military organization takes part in the disaster relief 
operation when requested. Stefan Maureau (MoD, interview annex 7.4): “We only fulfil 
the requested emergency relief support. The requesting country asks for what they need. 
We can or cannot meet the request and the governments decides if we are going to 
support the request”. 
Fanny de Swarte (EU ECHO, interview 7.8) was very clear on the question about the role 
of the military organization: “Preferably as little as possible”. Her reaction has to do with 
the attitude and behaviour of the military organizations. The Dutch military organization 
was very cooperative during the disaster relief operation of Matthew, but normally 
military organizations want to take the lead in disaster relief organizations and they are 
not as efficient as they think they are. The fact that being perceived as a neutral party is 
essential for non-military relief organizations. Coordination with military organization 
could endanger this neutrality and with that the personnel of the non-military relief 
organization (Fanny de Swarte EU ECHO, interview annex 7.8). 
 
The main opinion of the respondents is that the military organization is a last resort and 
only during natural sudden-onset disasters whithout conflicts. This is in line with the Oslo 
Guidelines. Annick van Lookeren Campagne of Oxfam Novib (Interview annex 7.5): “My 
opinion is that the military organization is a last resort. In case of a natural disaster, the 
role of the military organization is less political. But in case of conflicts, the military 
organization is not the desired relief organization to act within the humanitarian 
principles”. 
 
However, the military organization can be of great value for the disaster relief operations 
with their capacities. What the military organization has to take in mind, is that they are 
not in the lead. Disaster relief operations will always be led by non-military organizations. 
Just as Stephen MacAndrew stated: “They can provide some support, such as heavy lift 
or logistics support, but they are not humanitarians.” (IFRC, interview annex 7.7) 
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5 Discussions, conclusions and recommendations 
 
This chapter starts with discussing the results from the case study and the literature in 
perspective of the propositions validation. Then the conclusions of this case study are 
presented and this chapter ends with recommendations to improve the coordination to 
save more lives and for further research. 
 
5.1 Discussion 
5.1.1 The focus to overcome the disconnect in mutual understanding has to be on 
strategic and tactical level. 
On operational level, the military and the non-military relief organizations did not 
experience any coordination problems. Both military and non-military relief organizations 
on this level focusses on the main goal, saving lives and overcoming the (coordination) 
problems. Strongly motivated people in both camps (i.e. civil and military) usually find 
ways to surmount barriers that they encounter (Heaslip and Barber, 2014). On 
operational level, the relief workers see what a disaster really leads to and are 
confronted with the losses of lives.  
On tactical, but certainly on strategic level, the distance between the people in need and 
the relief organizations can lead to another perception of urgency. Also the difference in 
understanding between the military and non-military organizations is bigger on tactical 
and strategic level than on operational level. ‘Ignorance breeds contempt’. 
On tactical level, coordination challenges and problems occurred between military and 
non-military relief organizations. These problems occurred in organizational aspects such 
as the decision making process, but mainly on cultural aspects. Stephan MacAndrew of 
the IFRC illustrated the disconnect in mutual understanding very clear, when he said that 
the military are very helpful, but not humanitarian (Interview annex 7.7).  
Coordination challenges and problems on strategic level are mostly related to the 
‘humanitarian space’ of the (humanitarian) relief organizations. The participation of 
military organizations lead to challenges and problems with neutrality, humanity and 
impartiality. This became clear with the coordination between the Dutch MoFA and MoD. 
For the MoFA, the ‘humanitarian space’ meant no armed personnel. It substantiated this 
with the ‘Oslo Guidelines’. But legal experts of the Dutch MoD pointed out that the Oslo 
Guideline does not prohibit armed personnel for self-protection of self-defence. 
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5.1.2 The unfamiliarity with the Oslo Guidelines lead to unnecessary discussions (and 
delay) between military and non-military relief organizations. 
Vincenzo Bollettino (2014) concluded in his study on the Oslo Guidelines that only 12% 
of the respondents of his survey (a skilled group of professionals with many years of 
professional experience) thought that the Oslo Guidelines were used to develop 
organizational policy on humanitarian aid agency engagement with military actors.  
The case study of the disaster relief operation of hurricane Matthew showed the same 
trend. Only six of the twelve respondents are familiar with the Oslo Guidelines and only 
two key-informants said that the guidelines are leading for their organizations for the 
coordination between military and non-military relief organizations. 
 
The unfamiliarity and lack of clarity of the Oslo Guidelines led to the discussion between 
the Dutch MoFA and MoD. This discussion costed a lot of precious time to overcome this 
difference. In disaster relief operations “time means lives”. 
 
This result lead to discussions on what to do with the Oslo Guidelines. In the OCHA 
community, all the participants agreed upon the Oslo Guidelines. However the aim of the 
guidelines, establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in international 
disaster relief operations, is not reached. 
 
5.1.3 The military organization has only a broad provider role and delivers indirect 
assistance during disaster relief operations in the (immediate) response phase. 
The opinion of the humanitarian community is that military organizations are not 
humanitarian organizations. So there is no role for military organizations within 
(humanitarian) disaster relief operations. On the other hand, military organizations have 
a lot of transport and other useful capacities. They can deploy very fast and at (almost) 
every place where non-military relief organizations cannot come. With these 
characteristics, the military organization can be very helpful during disaster relief 
operations. The role of broad provider with direct and indirect assistance fits well. This is 
partly in line with the conclusions in the literature. Tatham and Rietjens (2016) only see 
an indirect assistance role with logistic support for the military organization. Non-military 
relief organizations requires that the military organizations only have a role during 
natural sudden-onset disaster relief operations in non-conflict areas. Then it is (or can be) 
safe for the humanitarian worker to coordinate and work with the military organizations. 
 
The opinions within the military community also vary. Some of the military key-
informants are convinced that the military organization has to wait for official requests 
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for support whilst other military key-informants are convinced that the military 
organization has to be prepared for possible disasters in areas where there is a higher 
possibility of the occurrence of disasters. 
The variety of opinions is also found in the literature. The main opinion is that military 
organizations has a specialist and broad provider role in disaster relief operations, 
because they can rapidly deploy with various useful material for disaster relief operation 
for direct and indirect assistance. Especially in the supply chain of disaster relief 
operations. 
 
For the coordination between the military and non-military relief organization it is 
essential that the roles of the organizations are clear. There are several aspects that the 
military and non-military relief organizations agree upon. First of all, the organizations 
see the importance of a broad provider logistic indirect assistance role for the military 
organization, especially with transport capacity. Secondly, the construction capacity of 
the military organizations can be used in the (immediate) response phase when there is 
no other possibility to reconstruct the infrastructure. And third, the military organizations 
have to hand over the relief goods for ‘the last mile delivery’ to the local non-military 
relief organizations.  
 
5.2 Conclusions 
5.2.1 Critical success factors of coordination 
There are different theories of critical success factors for coordination. All these theories 
have some factors in common. Because of the different types of organizations during 
disaster relief operations, the focus of the critical success factors has to be on 
overcoming these differences. The critical success factors for coordination during disaster 
relief operations are a clear goal, incentive for the coordination, open and equally 
communication (equal collocutor and common language), mutual respect on all aspects 
(culture and organization values) and clear task and role fulfilment.  
 
5.2.2 Coordination between military and non-military relief organizations during disaster 
relief operations 
Coordination between military and non-military relief organizations during disaster relief 
operations takes place on different organizational levels. UN OCHA set up the cluster 
system to The literature showed that coordination at operational level is more common 
than at tactical and strategic level. The case study showed the same phenomenon. At 
operational level, the military and non-military relief organizations had no problems with 
the coordination between each other. At tactical and strategic level, they indeed 
experienced challenges and problems with the coordination. These challenges were 
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caused by the organizational and cultural differences. The discussion on strategic level, 
between the Dutch MoFA and the MOD caused a significant delay for the start of the 
support with the Navy ships. Time in disaster relief operations means lives. This 
discussion had to do with the unfamiliarity with the Oslo Guidelines. 
 
5.2.3 The role of the military organization during disaster relief operations 
In 1994, the Oslo Guidelines (originated in 1992) were the result of a collaborative effort 
that culminated in an international conference in Oslo. The aim of the Oslo Guidelines is 
to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in IDRA. This goal is not 
reached. The military and non-military relief organizations are not very familiar with 
these guidelines and they are certainly not leading in the disaster relief operations. 
 
When the need is highest and the non-military relief organizations are not able to 
support the affected people, the military organizations are the ‘last resort’ and does not 
have to fit in their particular assistance role. 
 
There is no common understanding on the role of the military organizations during 
disaster relief operations. Even during natural made sudden-onset disasters without a 
conflict, there is no consensus on the role of the military organization. The military 
organizations can with their capacities fit in two of the three roles of Jensen and Hertz 
(2016); the specialist and the broad provider. The logistic role with the transport 
capacity as broad provider has the preference of the non-military relief organizations. 
This fits in the indirect assistance category of the Oslo Guidelines. The direct assistance, 
the face-to-face distribution of goods and services, has to be done by local non-military 
relief organizations who already has contact with the affected population and know their 
need. 
 
5.2.4 Improve the coordination between military and non-military relief organizations 
during disaster relief operations to save more lives 
The conclusions of the sub questions are the input for the main research question. “How 
can the coordination between the military organization and the non-military relief 
organization during disaster relief operations be improved?”. 
 
The analysis of the critical success factors for coordination showed that the factors 
common and mutual respect and a clear task and role fulfilment are critical for 
coordination between military and non-military relief organizations. On tactical and 
strategic level, the lack of mutual understanding on the organizational and cultural 
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differences between military and non-military relief organizations results in challenges 
and problems with the coordination. There is no common and mutual respect of the 
cultural and organization values, because of the unfamiliarity with the different 
organizations on these organizational levels. 
The military organizations do not have clearly defined tasks and roles within the disaster 
relief operations. The guidelines for the tasks and roles as stated in the Oslo Guidelines 
are unfamiliar to and therefore not used by the organizations within disaster relief 
operations. Furthermore military organizations have also no clear role as defined by 
Jensen and Hertz (2016). 
 
To improve the coordination between the military and the non-military relief 
organizations, there must be paid more attention to get mutual understanding on tactical 
and strategic level between these organizations.  
Besides that, the military organizations must have a clear role during disaster relief 
organizations. A first step to improve the coordination is to get familiarity and clarity on 
the Oslo Guidelines. Another step for improvement is for the military organization to 
accept that it has no leading but an assistance role during disaster relief operations.  
The difficulty for a clear task and role fulfilment, is that the military organization can 
have a direct or indirect assistance role. In general, the military it has an indirect 
assistance role, but dependent on the circumstances it has to fulfil a direct assistance 
and/or an infrastructure support role. The focus has to be on coordination before the 
concerning disaster relief operation to clarify the role of the military organizations. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 Improvements 
To improve the disconnect in common understanding between the military and non-
military relief organizations on tactical and strategic level, the organizations has to come 
in contact with each other. There are already conventions or congresses, education 
programs, courses and trainings organized on these levels. These are events to discuss 
about the organizational and cultural differences, so there is no disconnect in common 
understanding during the disaster relief operations. 
Besides that, there has to be a discussion about the familiarity and the goal of the Oslo 
Guidelines. All the organizations which participates in the cluster system during disaster 
relief operations have accepted these guidelines. But in practice, these guidelines are not 
used for disaster relief operations. Are these Oslo Guidelines still valid, should they be 
updated or thrown away? And when the guidelines are still valid, the content has not to 
be ambitious and familiar by all the participating organizations. To get the organizations 
familiar with the Oslo Guidelines and the other relief organizations, OCHA has to make 
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the education programs, courses and trainings mandatory before participating in the 
cluster system during disaster relief operations. 
 
5.3.2 Direction for further research 
This case study of the disaster relief operations of hurricane Matthew focused on the 
coordination between the Dutch military organization and the non-military relief 
organizations. The Dutch military organization is known to be an open, helpful and 
cooperative organization. This implies that the results can differ, when focussing on the 
coordination between another military organization and non-military relief organizations. 
Therefore, it is recommended to conduct this case study with military organizations other 
than the Dutch military, to get a more complete view. 
In this case study, the non-military relief organizations are presented as one group. It 
consists of (i)GOs and (i)NGOs. These organizations may have different goals, 
organizational structures and cultures. To get more details on the coordination challenges 
and problems, further research can focus on the possible differences between the 
coordination between military organizations and (i)GOs and the coordination between 
military organizations and (i)NGOs. 
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7 Annexes 
 
7.1 Semi-structured Interview 
 
7.1.1 Background of the research 
 
The research goal of this thesis is to provide insight in how the coordination between the 
military organization and the non-military organization during disaster relief operations 
can be improved to save more lives, by means of reviewing literature on humanitarian 
logistics and performing case study research on the hurricane Matthew on Haiti. This 
research analyses the deployment of Dutch military forces and the coordination with non-
military organizations during the disaster relief operations in Haiti. These interviews are a 
way to gather information about the way the Dutch military forces operated and 
coordinated in Haiti. Furthermore, information from evaluation documents (After Action 
Reviews (AAR)) will be studied to verify and validate this information (source 
triangulation). 
 
7.1.2 Purpose of the interview 
 
The purpose of this interview is to gain insight in the role Dutch military forces played 
during the disaster relief operation in Haiti. At the end of the interviews, there must be a 
chronological overview of the actions that were committed, the procedures that was 
followed and the coordination between the Dutch military forces and the non-military 
forces on all levels (strategic, tactical and operational level). The information gathered 
via this interview must contribute to a better overall understanding of the relationship 
between military forces and non-military forces and indicate the possible struggle in 
coordination that can cost extra lives during disaster relief operations. 
 
7.1.3 Important aspects that can influence the outcome of an interview 
 
The answers of the interviewee can be, and certainty are, own opinions and stories of the 
situation. These might lead to less objective results. To minimize this risk, the 
interviewer repeated the answer on the questions so the interviewee heard their own 
answer. And the transcript of the interview was send to the interviewee, so they could 
read their own answer again and give comments or corrections on these answers. 
 
7.1.4 Preparation 
 
The foundation for this interview lays within the literature review which forms the basis 
of this research. The used questionnaire is based on the questionnaire that is used for 
the report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2007). This is 
a research on the effectiveness of foreign military assets in natural disaster response. 
This questionnaire is also used by Van Schoorl (2010) 
 
7.1.5 Audience 
 
To get useful information about the role of the Dutch military forces and the coordination 
between them and the non-military organizations, the right audience has to be 
interviewed. To gather information about the role of the Dutch military forces, the key-
players within the Dutch military organizations on the different levels are interviewed. To 
gather information about the coordination between the Dutch military forces and the 
non-military forces, the key players of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN OCHA, 
UNDAC, ECHO and some of the biggest NGOs (International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), OXFAM NOVIB and CORDAID (part of Caritas Internationalis). 
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The interviews are representative for this research. Of the audience, seven interviews 
were conducted (four in person, two with face-time and one with the telephone). The 
other six respondents returned the questionnaire on paper/digital. 
 
7.1.6 Interview matrix 
 
The matrix gives an overview of the different questions, the audience and the level they 
are operate on. 
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7.2 Interview with representatives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2009). 
 
Interview with representatives of Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid, of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I am one of the five emergency aid specialists in the humanity team of the 
Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid. I was on duty when the hurricane 
Matthew made landfall on Haiti. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates all the 
requests for help. And we coordinate with the Ministry of Defence if the requested 
capacities are available. We also coordinate with the ‘Landelijke Operationeel 
Coordinatie Centrum” (LOCC). I coordinated the request for help from Haiti from start 
till the execution of the Dutch participation in the disaster relief operation for Matthew. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
We received the request via different channels. Before hurricane Matthew made 
landfall on Haiti, we received their request for help. They were aware of the two 
Dutch Navy ships in the region. So they requested for support with these ship during 
the disaster relief operations. We did not react on this request, because only want 
requests for capabilities and not for capacities (the two Navy ship (appropriateness). 
 
Because of the chaos in Haiti during and direct after the hurricane Matthew, it took a 
while before we received an official and correct request via the right procedures from 
Haiti. 
 
We knew that the request was coming, so we already coordinated with the Ministry of 
Defence to overlook which capacities were available. And the two Navy ships in the 
region of Haiti were part of the available capacities. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
We received the first and unofficial request before the hurricane Matthew made 
landfall on Haiti. Hurricane Matthew reached Haiti on Tuesday the 4th of October 2016. 
That the same day, late in the evening, we received the official request. It was still a 
very general request for capabilities, so every available capacity to fulfil these 
requested capabilities was good. We received this request later, because of the chaos 
on Haiti. 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted immediate on the request. We were already 
coordinating with the Ministry of Defence. And we also coordinated with EU ECHO. 
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
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We could not start any official action without the official request via the emergency 
relief mechanisms. And that took a while, because of the chaos. The government was 
not able to oversee the whole situation during and direct after hurricane Matthew. 
Before we could do anything, there had to be a signed ‘note verbale’. The ‘note 
verbale’ is a jurisprudental letter with arrangements between the supporting and 
supported countries. We had the content of this letter, but the Ministry of Defence 
wanted to insert the condition that they operate with armed personnel during the 
emergency relief operation. The Ministry of Defence had experience with the 
emergency operation during the earthquake on Haiti in 2010. The demand for ‘armed 
personnel’ had to be in the ‘note verbale’ and that took a while. 
I also had contact with the European Civil protection and Humanitarian aid Office 
(ECHO). EU ECHO is the coordinating office of the European Union and took care of (a 
part of) financing the European participation during the disaster relief operation for 
Haiti. 
 
Because the two Navy ships were already in the Caribbean, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had no task in coordination between the International Federation of the Red 
Cross and the Ministry of Defence. This was done localy. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
The request for help from Haiti was very general. They wanted any help we could 
facilitate. We translated this request in the needed capabilities, such as transport 
capacity, etc. In first instance the Netherlands offered emergency relief goods and 
later on also transport capacity (with the two Navy ships). We also send recovery 
capacity for activities like repairing of roads, reconstruction of a hospital and 
measurements of the berths. 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
Yes, we conducted a needs assessment, because it took a while before the official 
request was received. Normally, the UN and/or the EU conducts a need assessment. 
These assessments results in specific needs request (with the needed capabilities) 
and that will be coordinated with all the involved countries, local and international 
non-military relief organizations. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
The Netherlands do not have a MoU with Haiti. Therefore, a ‘note verbale’ was 
needed to make the jurisprudential arrangements between the Netherlands and Haiti. 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
Yes, we are familiar with the Oslo Guidelines. 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
For us, the Oslo Guidelines are leading for the use of the military organization during 
disaster relief operations. 
We had a discussion with the Ministry of Defence about the armed personnel. Whit 
(humanitarian) relief operations, you have to respect the ‘humanitarian principles’. 
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And this means that you do not use or carry any weapons. But the Ministry of 
Defence insisted to operate with armed personnel. Otherwise they did not want to 
carry out the emergency response operation. 
This discussion took a relatively long time. But in the end, we handled it 
pragmatically. 
Before any next disaster, we have to make some clear agreements on this 
discussionpoint. When there occurs a disaster, there is no time to discuss this point 
again. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
The Netherlands send two Navy ships as transport capacity for the unreachable 
locations (via the road). And we send some emergency relief goods (such as water 
purification tablets, shelters, etc.), recovery capacity and capacity to make some 
measurements for berths. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
Yes, we had direct contact with the Haitian government and local authorities. And we 
send a Liaison Officer from the Ministry of Defence to Haiti. He had contact with the 
local authorities, the UN and the EU. 
For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is of interest to prevent miscommunication 
between all actors to prevent overlap of actions and emergency relief aid.  
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
The Netherlands supported the emergency relief mission for two weeks in total. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
In first instance there was no requested period for the support. We offered our 
capacity for a week. But we received a request for prolongation for another week. 
And we accepted that. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
There is no emergency relief aid rejected by Haiti. But we rejected a second 
prolongation for another week. This was an unofficial and informal request. We hold 
on for the support for two weeks. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
Yes, we were able to provide all the requested help. 
 
6. Coordination 
 
 47 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
The coordination was on different organizational levels. On forehand, there was 
bilateral contact with Belgium. They wanted to use capacity of the Dutch Navy ships, 
but these ships were already in the Caribbean. And there was coordination with Haiti, 
the UN, the EU and with the Ministry of Defence on different levels. 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
Because of the coordination by the UN and the EU there was no overlap. That is 
because of the sector (cluster) system. And it was clear what capacities the 
Netherlands could deliver. 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
There is a difference in coordination systems. Military organizations have a different 
status than the non-military relief organizations. The military organization is an 
executive organization of the politic/government. The coordination with the non-
military relief organizations concerns more about the financial resources and the 
control of correct use of these financial resources. 
When it becomes a governmental operation, then the coordination of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs concerns more than only money. 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
There were no problems reported. In our opinion there were no problems with the 
coordination between the military and the non-military relief organizations. And the 
emergency relief aid was very appreciated. 
There was a discussion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
defence about the armed personnel of the military organization. 
The navy ships were already on the move before we had permission to go. Gladly, 
the ships were not in the territorial waters of Haiti, so it caused no problems. 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
The coordination with the UN was good. The coordination with the government of 
Haiti was not always effective, because of the chaos in Haiti. The coordination 
between the UN and the EU could be better, to ensure that the procedures of the 
emergency relief aid becomes clear to each other. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
The delivered emergency relief aid was good and appreciated. It was necessary and 
the execution was effective. It could have been more efficient, especially without the 
discussion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence about 
the armed personnel of the military organization. I took a lot of precious time. 
The coordination with the UN and the EU was good. 
 
The ‘lessons learned’ is to make arrangements before the next disasters. At the 
moment of the occurrence of a disaster, there is no time. 
7. Costs 
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7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
Yes, we are familiar with the costs. The military organization budgeted the additional 
costs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the costs that are made for the emergency 
relief aid). This is a ‘lesson learned’ from earlier disaster relief operations.  Before this 
payment system, they used receipts of the costs of every activity.  
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
It is financed with different budgets. The Ministry of Defence paid the ‘normal’ costs 
(personnel costs, etc.) out of their regular budget. The additional costs were paid by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and these are (for a great part) financed by the EU 
from the ‘EU contribution’. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed the costs from the ‘Non-ODA’ budget. The 
‘ODA’ budget is for development aid. And emergency aid is paid from the ‘Non-ODA’ 
budget. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
It is always the question how the emergency aid can be more efficient. We try to let 
the local non-military relief organizations help the affected people and hire the 
transport capacity locally. But this local capacity is not always available by different 
reasons. And for this moment the delivered emergency relief aid and the transport 
capacity was efficient 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
It is good to provide emergency relief aid when possible and needed. The question is 
if the military organization should deliver the relief goods by themselves or only 
deliver transport capacity and leave the distribution to the non-military relief 
organizations. 
There also has to be decided if the delivery of emergency relief aid is with armed or 
unarmed personnel. 
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7.3 Interview with representative of the Ministry of Defence 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2006). 
 
Interview with LTZ1 Stefan Maureau, deputy head of bureau National Operations of the 
Dutch Defence Staff. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I am responsible for the coordination of the National Operations of the Dutch military 
organization. Disaster relief is a part of this. All request for assistance by military 
organizations go via bureau National Operations. We coordinate the request intern 
the Ministry of Defence. We give the order to the military units who have to execute 
the assignment. After hurricane Matthew, we received the request for relief aid and 
we coordinated intern the Ministry of Defence and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
We coordinate the whole project from start to finish. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
There were different lines: 
Initial, there was a general request for help from the Haitian government. Even 
before the hurricane Matthew landed on Haiti. This request was also send to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but they did not react on this request. 
Later on, the UN and the EU picked up the request and put it through to the countries. 
In this way, the request came again at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and via them by 
us. From that moment, we could look at the available capacity. We also looked at the 
available budget. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs offers the capacity to the EU. We 
only want to offer the capacity that is really needed. And so we would not want to 
offer capacity what is not needed. The efficiency was very important in this case. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
The official request for emergency aid, which was a very general request for help and 
did not ask for specific capacities, was received late on the 4th of October (the day of 
the occurrence of hurricane Matthew). On the 7th of October the Ministry of Defence 
agreed with the request for emergency aid. On then 8th of October, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (Minister Ploumen) agreed with the request. But that was not the start 
of the delivery of emergency aid. The military organization needs permission to 
support on Haiti, otherwise they could not land on Haiti. There is then the possibility 
that the Dutch military persons fall under the Haitian law. To coordinate this, a ‘note 
verbale’ was needed. This has to be arranged between the Haitian government and 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It took a week before the ‘note verbale’ was 
ready. The Haitian government did not know how to set up a ‘note verbale’, and 
because of the chaos it was difficult to find the right person to sign this paper. And in 
our security assessment, Haiti was not a safe country. This is the reason that the 
Dutch military organization wanted to execute the support with armed personnel. 
This lead to a discussion between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that is was not allowed by the Oslo 
Guidelines to execute emergency relief with armed personnel. But our legal advisors 
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said that it was possible, regarding the guidelines. In the ‘note verbale’ has to be 
changed for this. Also declaring relief goods in Haiti had to be taken in the ‘note 
verbale’. Otherwise we had to pay taxes over all these relief goods. 
The delay was also caused by the unexperienced persons within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Because of the personnel changes, the procedures for emergency 
relief aid and the coordination with the Ministry of Defence were not known. 
Finally, we let the ambassador sign the ‘note verbale’. 
 
Until the ‘note verbale’ was signed, we could not execute emergency relief. This 
caused some trubbles intern the military organization. The two naval ships wanted to 
go already. Also within the Defence Staff, the commander wanted to execute the 
emergency relief support. Because, after a few more days it was too late to execute 
disaster relief and save lives. In the end we prohibited the naval ships to enter the 
territorial waters of Haiti. 
 
The delay was very disturbing, also because there were journalist. They filmed the 
state of emergency and told that the Dutch military organization doesn’t do anything 
about it while they are in the neighbourhood. We wanted to execute the relief aid, but 
from the point of being a good employer, we prohibited to do anything without our 
permission.  
 
Gladly, we hold on our demand to send our troops armed with weapons. In Haiti, 
convoys are ambushed. But that did not happened with the Dutch military 
organization. 
 
The official start of the emergency relief aid was on the 11th of October. 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
Initially, Haiti send a very general request for help. We helped to specific the request 
to the needed capacities. This resulted exactly in the request for capacities that we 
could deliver.  
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
As before, there was a general request for help. We helped Haiti to ask for the 
capacities they needed and we could deliver. 
 
Before the start of the operation, the naval ships were already in the neighbourhood. 
The media made a negative image of the military organization. The time that the 
ships were there, but may not operate, they used for coordination with the authorities 
and the representatives from the not-military relief organizations. And they could 
explain to the media why they could not start with the emergency aid. For this all the 
credits to David Boom and Rob Pulles. 
 
In the time the ships could not start with the help, the Zr.Ms. Pelikaan went to get a 
ponton they made on their own. They could use this for places where they could not 
moor. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
The two naval ships helped as transport capacity. We also send some emergency 
goods and we had capacity to repair infrastructure (roads and a hospital). This 
capacity was not directly asked, but it fell under the request for help. Later on, we 
send some hydrographic capacity. This gave insight were the sips could more or not. 
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3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
The military organization did not send an assessment team in advance. We did a 
needs assessment to support the request for help. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
There was no MoU or other agreement with Haiti concerning the liability. That was 
the reason that there was a need for the ‘note verbale’. In this ‘note verbale’ came 
the agreements with jurisdiction, permission to enter Haiti and the import taxes of 
the relief goods.  
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
Yes, these are known 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
They were not leading for the Ministry of Defence, but they were important for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This led to the discussion about the armed military 
personnel. This was caused by the statement of Minister Koenders that emergency 
aid always is without weapons. 
But our experience is that in some cases we need to go armed. With the emergency 
help on Dominica, we went unarmed despite of the threat analysis that said we had 
to go armed. In the end, this lead to chaos at the end distribution. When people need 
relief goods, they do anything to get these relief goods. 
For Haiti, the threat analysis said that we should go armed. This time we hold on this 
request, despite the counterwork of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This point is a 
dividing line between military and non-military organizations. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not known with military rules of engagement. They 
hink that these rules are for the use of weapons. But these are just regulations for 
when and how to use the weapons. And in this cause, only in self-defence 
 
And the Oslo guidelines do not say that you cannot be armed. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
We did some recovery on the infrastructure with our engineers. And we repaired a 
hospital with all the means we could get. We did some transports of relief goods and 
we used our hydrographic capacity to look were there was capacity to moor. 
There was also offered capacity from the army in The Netherlands, but was on their 
own initiative. We rejected this, because it did not fall under the request of help. We 
only deliverd the asked assistance to be as effective and efficient as possible. 
 
In-between there was a request for transporting medicines. This request came 
because our convoys were not ambushed. This was because our military organization 
was armed. This request came from non-military relief organizations, but was 
 52 
requested by the Hatian government. This request went from Haiti via the UN and EU 
to the Mininstry of Foreign Affairs. This is the unique capacity that the military 
organization could deliver.  
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
On strategic level there was only contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated with Haiti, the EU and the UN. 
By sending an Liaison Officer on tactical and operational level, there was direct 
contact with the non-militaryu relief organizations and the local authorities. They 
could tell what emergency relief was needed when and where. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
In total, we delivered support for two weeks with our naval ships. Initially it was one 
week, but we get a request for prolongation for another week. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
Initial there was a request for one week. But in that week we received a request for 
prolongation for another week. On the last day of this week, the UN wanted that the 
ships stayed for a third week. We rejected this request. The reason for this rejection 
is that an extra interruption of the plan costs to many (the ships had to be 
replenished) and the ships were already on the move. And there was no budget for 
the extra help. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU would not pay for this help. 
And it was not an official request.  
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
There is no emergency relief aid rejected. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
We were able to answer to the request for help. Mainly because we helped to 
translate the general request for help in a more specific request for help. 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
There was coordination with other countries. From day one, we had contact with the 
united States of America. This lead to an advantage. The first week and a half we 
could use the medical facility of the US. Unfortunately we had an accident after that 
period. We had to transport this wounded person to the nearest hospital in the US. 
On strategic level there was no other coordination with another country or with a 
non-military relief organization. In our order to the units we said that they had to 
coordinate on operational level with the local authorities and the non-military relief 
organizations to support on the right place at the right time.  
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6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
There are no problems known. On strategic level there was no direct coordination 
with non-military relief organizations. And there were no problems in the rapports of 
the units on tactical and operational level. 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
This was very effective. Just because the coordination the emergency relief went very 
well. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
The execution of the help was very good and we had compliments for that from Haiti 
and the UN. This is a sign that the emergency relief was good. 
 
The ‘lessons learned’ are on the coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defence. This is because the bad knowledge retention at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Another cause was that the Haitian government was in chaos. This is logical, but that 
pleas for agreements in advance. It was clear that hurricane Matthew went to Haiti, 
so there was time to arrange things. And maybe there should be some standard 
arrangements, because Haiti is affected several times by disasters and will be in the 
future. 
 
The ministry of Defence send out a LO to lead the coordination on tactical and 
operational level. This was a very good thing. 
 
Intern the Ministry of Defence were also some wobbles, because the functional 
commander was on leave. This led to impatient when we had to wait for the ‘note 
verbale’ because they did not know why they had to wait. 
 
There was a discussion about the weapons. For us it was a critical success factor.  
 
The procedure for arranging the ‘note verbale’ was unknown with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
Everybody has an opinion on emergency relief. And everybody wants to participate. 
That leads to inefficient discussions. 
 
The military organizations is used to plan everything. Within the Ministry of Foreign 
affairs the planning with the relief operations of Haiti was not started very soon. They 
wait till the last moment before the action has to be taken. 
 
 
7. Costs 
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7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
Yes, I am familiar with the costs of the operation. 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
Only the additional costs of the operation are paid by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
These cost are the extra fuel, extra working hours and the extra materials that were 
needed (emergency relief goods, shelters, water purification sets, etc.). The normal 
costs are paid by the Ministry of Defence self. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
Because we only brought the additional costs into account, the support was very 
efficient. We supported for relatively little money. 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
We only execute the asked emergency relief support. The requesting organization 
asks for wat they need. And we can or cannot call the request. 
 
It depends on the situation for what the Ministry of Defence can deliver or support. In 
this particular case, we had the unique capacity of naval ships, marines and 
engineers. The ‘last mile’ distribution of the emergency relief goods is executed by 
the non-military relief organizations. 
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7.4 Interview with representative of Oxfam Novib 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2006). 
 
Interview with Annick van Lookeren Campagne, humanitarian policy advisor at Oxfam 
Novib. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I hadn’t a direct role during the hurricane Matthew in Haiti. Oxfam Novib is active in 
Haiti and tries to help the Haiti people with clean water by making well’s, distribute 
water purification tablets and hygiene kits to prevent the outbreak of cholera. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
There are two different ways of how Oxfam Novib can be asked for help. The first way 
is that the country asks Oxfam Novib in an official way. The second way is that our 
own local field offices starts the assistance and they can ask the region offices or 
even the headquarters of Oxfam Novib for extra assistance. 
Oxfam Novib has clear procedures for considering and execute relief requests  
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
We were already active in Haiti, because of the assistance after the earthquake in 
2010. There was still cholera in some locations in Haiti. 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
The guiding thought of delivering emergency aid is based on the humanitarian 
principles and the saving of lives. Within these thought, we responded with the extra 
distribution of the water purification tablets and hygiene kits. 
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
There were no extra actions needed. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
For this particular case, there were purification tablets and hygiene kits necessary. 
But in general there is a need for money, logistics (transportation capacity), 
manpower and knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
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3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
Before starting with the emergency aid, Oxfam Novab always carries out a needs 
assessment. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
I do not know that. 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
Yes, I am familiar with the Oslo Guidelines. 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
No. There was no interaction with the military organization after the Hurricane 
Matthew. Normally are the civilian-military agreements leading for us. Arrangements 
are made by humanitarian actors and the military about how to interact with each 
other in case of natural disasters and man-made conflicts. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
As mentioned before, we were already in Haiti. And we did not chance the sort of 
assistance. Only we enlarged it. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
Yes, Oxfam is a registrated humanitarian organization and we have field offices in 
Haiti. This means that there is contact with (local) authorities, local organizations and 
the population. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
We are still delivering assistance. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
The emergency aid is in accordance with the request. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
During this operation, there was no assistance rejected. 
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5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
Sufficient means for relief is a problem all over the world. 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
Yes, the UN OCHA used the cluster system to coordinate the humanitarian and 
disaster relief operation. In this particular case it was called the sector system, 
because Haiti wanted to stay in the lead instead of the UN. 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
Overall was the assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary. But not all organizations are registered by the UN and they operate 
solely. In those cases, the assistance could be overlap. 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
Normally, Oxfam Novib does not coordinate with military organization. In this specific 
case, we did not coordinate with the Dutch military organization. 
But in general there is a difference between the coordination with military 
organizations. That is why rules have been issued how to coordinate with military 
organizations (as a last resort), so that (humanitarian) relief organizations can 
comply with the humanitarian principles. 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
We did not coordinate with the Dutch military organization.  
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
This depended on the kind of sector. The coordination in some sectors were very 
good, but within some sectors it was ‘less’ good. But coordination with other relief 
actors and with the authorities is extremely important. Oxfam Novib will always argue 
in favour of that. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
We evaluate the contribution of assistance as good, but it always can be bettered. We 
are still within our ‘lessons learned’ cycle. 
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
No, I am not familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation. As Oxfam Novib, 
we were already in Haiti. And this was additional aid. 
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7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
Our assistance is funded by donors and public funds. Oxfam Novib will never accept 
money from the Ministry of Defence to execute relief operations. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
I do not have insight of that. 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
My opinion is that the military organization is a last resort. But it is depending on the 
context. In the case of a natural disaster, the role of the military organization is less 
political. But in case of conflicts (for example being part of an international military 
mission) the role of military organizations  are political. And that means that they are 
not the desired (humanitarian) relief worker that can act within the humanitarian 
principles. 
 
But the military organization has good logistic means, is able to respond rapidly (in 
the respond phase) and is very capable of restoring and repairing the infrastructure 
(bridges and road repair). 
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7.5 Interview with representative of CORDAID 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2009). 
 
Interview with Paul Borsboom, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) advisor 
Humanitarian Aid of Cordaid. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
My role is various. I am advisor on WASH, I do general humanitarian relief aid and I 
am expert on search capacity. Within Cordaid, this is the Humanitarian Aid Unit. I am 
general employable. Last year, I went to Iraq to reinforce the response capacity, 
because of the Mosul offensive. I had the assignment to set up the response aid. It 
was a very general assignment. As WASH expert, I technical support colleagues in 
the office and in the field. With Caritas Internationales, Cordaid is part of this 
international organization, we are setting up working groups in shelter, WASH and 
accountability to beneficiaries to offer specific aid. We also are setting up a working 
group for emergency response coordinators. With disasters, various Caritas 
organizations give emergency aid. This can be more than twenty organizations. On 
that moment, the emergency response coordinators take the coordination at the first 
three - six weeks. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
There has always be a request for support. But this can be requested in different 
ways. 
The emergency response request can come from local Caritas organizations. They ask 
for specific relief aid. They coordinate their needs with several Caritas organizations. 
Only a few Caritas organizations are direct operational during emergency situations. 
These are most of the time the Catholic Releas Services (CRS), Cordaid, the German, 
the Swiss and the Czech organizations. Other members of Caritas Internationales 
usually only send money. 
The local Caritas organization set up an appeal. This appeal goes into the network of 
Caritas Internationalis. For a great part, this is a financial network. When the local 
Caritas organization needs other capacities, other Caritas organizations can react on 
the request by sending support. 
 
Another way is that Cordaid supports when an emergency arise. We can use our own 
funds for this.  
 
It is also possible to react on a disaster when there is no Caritas appeal or where 
Caritas is not active. Caritas has a pools of experts. These experts are send all over 
the world, so there is almost no place where Caritas is not active.  
We, Cordaid, increasingly act together with Caritas. 
 
Emergency response aid often starts before the UN is started. The UN is too 
bureaucratic for rapid response. By a local Cordaid organization it can be arranged 
with a single phone call. Sometimes we do not start with emergency response but 
aim on the recovery phase. 
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When Cordaid delivers emergency relief, we always have to do this in coordination 
with the UN OCHA. The UN OCHA coordinates the emergency relief through the 
cluster system. And we agreed to take part in this system. This system was set up 
after the tsunami in 2004. And in 2010, during the earthquake of Haiti, it did not act 
very good. 
 
When we operate with the cluster system, we are part of the logistics cluster. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
No answer 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
No answer 
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
No answers 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
Cordaid has no transport capacity on their own. For this need we have to use civil 
transport companies or the transport capacity of the military organizations. And the 
use of military transport capacity for deployment is always coordinated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The last time was for the emergency relief for the 
earthquake in 2010 in Haiti. We could use the free space in the military transport 
airplane. For the emergency relief operation with the cyclone Haiyan in 2013 in 
Vietnam, we could use the free capacity of two airplanes of the military organization. 
 
And we coordinated with the military organization during the emergency relief 
operation after the Ebola outbreak in the horn of Africa. We could use the transport 
capacity of the Dutch Navy ship Zr. Ms. Karel Doorman. 
 
Cordaid is also part of the ‘Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties’ (SHO)(coordinating 
relief organizations). The SHO does not have capacity for daily governance. That’s 
why the chairman is a rotating position. During The cyclone Haiyan and the Ebola 
outbreak, Cordaid had the position of chairman. I was the emergency relief 
coordinator that time. I had to arrange all the logistic support for the operations. 
 
With the cyclone Haiyan, I called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the question for 
the use of the military transport capacity. Because of this particular case, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs set up a general procedure. This was a big help during the Ebola 
outbreak. 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
We always try to do that on our own or with help of the local Caritas organization. 
If this is not possible, we use the assessment of the UN. And we try to be part of the 
UN assessment team. Because we are not a very big organization, that is not always 
possible. CRS is big enough to be a part of the UN assessment team. 
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The local partner organizations of Cordaid are trained in assessing the needs of the 
local population.  
 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
We do not have any MoU with the countries where we send our help to. 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
No, I don’t know them in detail. 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
No, we do not use these guidelines for the coordination with the military organization. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
No answer 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
No answer 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
Cordaid is still helping. Normal, the emergency aid is for a period of six months. In 
this period, the budget of the SHO has to be spend. But Cordaid is not really a first 
responder. We focus more on the recovery phase, but we are present in the 
(immediate) response phase. In this phase, we can assess what is needed in the 
recovery phase. We try to help the people so that they can take care of their own. It 
is difficult for us to use the budget within the six months. Recovery takes time before 
we can spend the money. And these processes are slower than (immediate) response 
relief. 
This procedure of the SHO is for the donors. If we use the budget within the six 
months, we can show our donors that we are doing good things with their money. 
And for non-military relief organizations it is very good to be there in the beginning. 
Our first task is to help the affected people, but we also want to gain more donors. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
No answer 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
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Our emergency aid is never rejected. But there are examples that we, Cordaid, 
rejected the request of some countries. Especially request from ‘strong’ regimes. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
We try, but it is not always possible. We do not have enough budget to bring all the 
help that is needed. The request is always more than that we can deliver.  
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
We do coordinate with our local organizations and we coordinate with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs when we want to use capacity of the military organization. 
And with relief operations, we coordinate within the cluster system. 
 
For example, we had a project with the distribution of pregnant cows. The idea was 
that the calf had to go to another person. And so on and on… But there was a 
drought in that country, so there wasn’t any food for the cows. We the asked the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver food for the cows to that country. When they 
were finished with laughing about that idea, they distributed hay and the project went 
very well. 
 
And we coordinated with the Belgian military organization. They had transport 
capacity we could use. 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
No answer 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
No answer 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
As Cordaid, we do not have problems with military organizations. That is because we 
are very pragmatic. Of course there are some little problems. But to overcome the 
differences between us and the military organization, we participate in discussion 
groups and exercises with the military organizations. We than can make clear that it 
is not always possible for us to coordinate with them, because of the ‘humanitarian 
principles’. It once happened that the military organizations was offended when we 
did not want to be seen with them. But because of the exercises and discussion 
groups, we do understand each other better now. 
We want to coordinate with the military organizations, especially on transport 
capacity and information. And it is not always possible for us to share the information 
in the open.  
 
We ‘drool’ of the transport capacity of the military organization. For us it is too 
expensive to have it on our own. And during the operation it can be very expensive to 
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hire transport capacity or the market is saturated. When the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs hire the transport capacity of the military organization, we can use it for free.  
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
The coordination on strategic level between us and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
the use of military capacity was effective. But it felt more that the Dutch government 
wanted to show that they help countries in need instead of really wanted to help the 
affected population. 
We do not use the military capacity all the time. It is better for the local economy 
when we rent local transport capacity. Our help is more focussing on giving money to 
the affected people, so they can restore their normal lives. We check if the affected 
people uses the money in the right way. And when they use it for other things, we 
stop the help. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
We always make a lessons learned report. And often we make a midterm report. We 
use these reports to use the lessons in our procedures. This is the reason why we 
now help with money and the check procedures instead of bringing help to the 
countries. 
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
No answer 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
No answer 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
No answer 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
When the military organization is part in a peacekeeping mission, they are not neutral. 
And in those cases, it is difficult for us to coordinate with them. 
We can coordinate with the military organizations during natural disaster relief 
operations. And the focus of the coordination is on logistics. This also can be on 
expertise in logistics, because the military has a good logistic organization. 
During disaster relief operations within the Netherlands, the military organization has 
a clear role. With disaster relief operations in other countries, the military 
organization has to be requested. It is difficult to point out a clear role to the military 
organization during disaster relief operations. 
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7.6 Interview with representative of OCHA UNDAC 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2006). 
 
Interview with Ronald Christiaans, team member of UNDAC, UN OCHA. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I was part of the UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) team, which was 
sent to Haiti in response to the hurricane Matthew. 
During this mission I had three roles to play: 
Day 1: general team member (administration, organization, support, Information 
Management (IM)). Initially I was supposed to coordinate the helicopter transport, 
but in practice it was hard to transfer that task. For that reason, the original 
coordinator stayed in charge of that task. 
Day 1-4: Civil Military Coordinator (CMCOORD) officer. I acted in that role till LTZ1 
Clemens Buter arrived. I supported Clemens till the arrival of his Canadian successor. 
The successor arrived at the same time as the Dutch navy ships. That was a lucky 
coincidence. 
Day 2-end of the mission: deputy team leader / On Site Operational Coordination 
(OSOCC) manager. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
The UNDAC team went to Haiti at the request of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator 
(HC) / Residence Coordinator (RC). The team was already in Port-au-Prince (PaP) 
before the hurricane reached Haiti. 
Based on the situation in Haiti, the presence of MINUSTAH and the international 
military assistance, I requested OCHA for submitting a ‘real’ CMCOORD officer to the 
UNDAC team. 
The Emergency Service Branch is responsible for all humanitarian assistance. Within 
that branch the Field Coordination Support Section is responsible for sending out 
UNDAC. There is also a section with regard to civil military coordination. That section 
has requested for the availability of LTZ1 Clemens Buter for this function. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
Before the hurricane made landfall, a small team already went to Haiti. The storm 
turned out worse than expected. That’s why extra UNDAC capacity was called in on 
5th of October. I was selected and arrived on 6th of October at Haiti. 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
UNDAC makes a request to all UNDAC members to report their availability. After that 
they select the members, who will be sent to the disaster area. I was part of that 
UNDAC team, which went to Haiti after hurricane Matthew. 
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
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No additional actions were necessary to meet the request. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
Beside the own gear, no means were required. 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
UNDAC carried out an aerial assessment. Because of the security situation it wasn’t 
possible to carry out an assessment in the field and because the grounds were 
difficult to access, we couldn’t go to all places. Besides that, the Haitian government 
wanted to keep the relief operation small (the reason for that is the experience after 
the earthquake in 2010). They limited the freedom of movement of UNDAC. That’s 
why UNDAC copied the assessment of the relief organizations on the spot. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
We fall under the UN flag. I don’t know in detail how things are arranged in case of 
legal liability. 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
I am aware that these exist. 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
These are not the guiding thought. If we need something from a military organization, 
we ask them. They see for themselves what is possible or not. As UNDAC, we had 
little influence on the deployment of the Dutch military organization. Their 
deployment was coordinated by the logistic cluster of the OCHA cluster system. In 
Haiti is was called the sector system, because the government didn’t want to call it 
clusters. It reminded to much of the ‘imposed’ help during the earthquake, where 
Haiti was taken over by the (humanitarian) relief organizations. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
We, as UNDAC, rather coordinated the support and didn’t deliver it by ourselves. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
We were in direct contact with several parties, including the Haitian authorities. 
 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
 66 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
There is an OCHA office on Haiti. They were not sufficient effective and efficient in 
their actions after the hurricane. From Ocha there has been an assessment, which led 
to extra support. Then the UNDAC team was called in. The UNDAC is a first response 
team. They take the coordination on themselves in the first few weeks and they clear 
the way for the long term coordination. The long term coordination is conducted by 
an Emergency Response Team (ERT). That team takes over from UNDAC. On Haiti, 
that team is still there. 
In principle UNDAC conducts the life-saving phase. We were there till 26th of October 
(I was there till the 24th and the last one till the 26th of October), but the last ones of 
the UNDAC team were already merged into the ERT. The ERT took over from us on 
the 21th of October. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
A request was made to stay longer. The request was made by OCHA Geneva. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
Haiti wanted to keep the relief operation as small as possible. That’s why some 
emergency aid was rejected. An example of that is the refusal the Emergency Medical 
Team met. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
That is not applicable to UNDAC. 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
There was coordination with authorities, local and international relief organizations. I 
focused on the coordination between civilian and military organizations. I tried to 
make sure that not two separate lines came into existence. All information had to be 
shared by them. 
UNDAC acts as coordinating body between several organizations. The coordination 
with the military went well, but there was not really expertise in that field available. 
Now by chance I do have some knowledge and experience with military organizations 
and LTZ1 Clemens Buter was offered as Liaison Officer (LO). However, the both of us 
were not well educated for the function as CMCOORD 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
Mostly the organizations complemented each other. Only the not-registered relief 
organization could have offered capacity, which was already offered by others. The 
coordination from the clusters (what actually couldn’t be named clusters, but sectors) 
was organized in a way that there were no double capacities in the area. 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
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UNDAC had little coordination with the Dutch Ministry of Defence. In this case 
Defence fell mainly under the sector logistics, which was led by the WFP. However, 
some Ministries of Defence of other countries carry out duties on their own without 
informing UNDAC.  
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
The coordination with the American military is very difficult. They mainly go their own 
way without good coordination with other organizations present. 
 
The support of the Dutch military was very good. The coordination went well with 
LTZ1 Clemens Buter. Haiti was so pleased with the support, that they asked for an 
extra prolongation. Ultimately, the Dutch government refused the second 
prolongation. 
 
Besides that, there still remains a difference between military and non-military relief 
organizations. They don’t always show mutual understanding. The non-military 
decision making differs from the military. More attention should be paid to this in 
case of relief operations. The question is how to make use of the military organization 
without frustrating the civilian process. 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
The coordination was effective. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
Where the decision to deploy is made, there should also be the knowledge. Now, the 
decision for prolongation or not where made in The Hague without situational 
awareness. 
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
No, I’m not familiar with the height of the costs. 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
I don’t know anything about this. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
Based on the previous question, I am not able to answer this question. However, 
from what I have seen, it could be more efficient on some fields. For example the 
Americans made use of helicopter capacity on their own without any control from 
UNDAC. Because of this the capacity was not always used in the most efficient way. 
 
 
 
8. Concluding 
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8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
I believe that a military organization can play an essential role during an emergency 
situation, as well national as international. It depends on how that support is 
embedded in the civilian structure. 
 
It is also smart to have capacities ready in advance, when a disaster is coming up. In 
some cases you can prepare yourself in a right way, especially in the Caribbean. 
 
Military organizations are very focussed on their own processes and these do not 
match with the civilian processes 
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7.7 Interview with representative of EU ECHO 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2006). 
 
Interview with Fanny de Swarte, Disaster prevention and crisis management advisor. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I was part of the European Civil Protection team from ECHO, which was sent to Haiti. 
This is the coordination team for the short term. We were the relieving team. Before 
that a similar team was already in place on Haiti for three weeks. 
My role was that of coordination expert / Information Manager (IM). The team existed 
of six persons. My task was to keep people inside and outside the team informed 
about the operation. I maintained regular contact with LTZ1 Clemens Buter, because 
de Dutch military was deployed through the EU channels. Besides that, we shared the 
information. Also the information about the security situation. Echo has two branches. 
The branch which will be sent to the disaster area on short notice. This is the Civil 
Protection (CP) branch. For aid on the long term has ECHO the Humanitarian 
Assistance (HA) branch. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
The request for emergency relief was received through formal and informal channels. 
 
The formal channel: 
On the 4th of October the hurricane Matthew swept through Haiti. The day before a 
request for emergency relief was made by Haiti to the UN. The UN passed the request 
on to the EU via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre of the EU. In the EU 
are the less or more rich countries who can support the disaster relief operations with 
capacity and money. In The Netherlands, the request will end up at Landelijk 
Operationeel Coordinatie Centrum (LOCC)  and National Coordination Centre (NCC). 
 
The informal channel: 
I have access to a UN information system in regard to detection of disasters. In this 
system , you are able to see which disasters are coming up. I used the system the 
keep informed about the evolving of Matthew, because of my job on Saba. Therefore, 
I knew that probably a request for emergency relief was on the way. I had already 
contact with LTZ1 Clemens Buter and I informed him with this information. I know 
Clemens from our coordination in the Caribbean. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
Immediately on the day of the hurricane we received the first request for support. On 
the 20th of October, we received a request for prolongation. 
 
 
 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
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ECHO reacted by sending two teams. The first team was the CP team. They were 
deployed for a short term until they were relieved in place by a HA team. That was 
the second team. ECHO deploys a team to coordinate the EU emergency aid. The first 
team was in place on Haiti at the 7th of October. 
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
In the first instance the terms of employment have to be agreed to. This is a three 
party contract. This means that I am insured by the EU from the moment I get on the 
plane for deployment till the moment I get off the plane after the redeployment. This 
also means that I fall under the right law. 
We are trained in advance. We also receive a safety briefing, clear orders and a 
packing list in advance. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
We don’t render emergency aid by ourselves or distribute emergency relief packages. 
So that is why no additional means are necessary. 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
Befor the deployment, we assess what we possibly can come across in the disaster 
area. In advance we receive a safety briefing and clear orders including the budget 
we have. And we received a personal packing list.  
 
In the first place we come into contact with the government and disaster duty 
coordinator for Haiti. We used the need assessment of the government, but we also 
use the assessment of the relief organizations to confirm the needs. 
 
We also can carry out an assessment by ourselves. In the first team some 
assessment experts were present. They did have a look at the need for water and 
sanitation. That produced a great deal of information. For my part the needs were 
clear and the question was how to match those needs. 
 
Because of the election time in Haiti, the EU was afraid the emergency relief would 
come to nothing. We dealt with this in a conscious way. For example, we offered 
water purification tablets to Haiti, but at the same time we made sure that a relief 
organization was linked to it in order that it could be arranged to be delivered on the 
right spot. 
 
But sometimes this was rejected, because the government wanted to do the delivery 
biy themselves. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
Standard it is arranged by the EU. So before the operation, it is already in place. At 
the moment of emergency relief there is no time to arrange it. There is no MoU with 
Haiti innplace. 
 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
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Yes, that is part of my training 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
These guidelines apply to us and to the use of military assets. On strategic and 
tactical level, we were involved and we applied the guidelinses, but on operational 
level they deal with it in a pragmatic way. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
We provide the coordination between the Haitian authorities and the relief 
organizations including the military organizations. 
 
I was part of the following CP team. The first team arrived on Haiti on the 7th of 
October. Three weeks later, I arrived and we also stayed for three weeks. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
Yes, we were in direct contact with the Haitian authorities. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
We provided coordination twice for three weeks with regard to emergency relief from 
the EU. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
The request for emergency aid was very general and not specified. It was clear to the 
Haitian government that we were for the short term. 
 
The request for the second prolongation to the Dutch navy ships went through all 
channels. The Haitian government was very pleased with the capacity. Haiti has 
requested the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to let them stay and the request also 
went via the EU. Also the director of ECHO has contacted the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. The formal letter of the Haitian government has been sent to the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs one day before departure of the ships. On that moment, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the Dutch support to the disaster relief 
operation were not prolong, because it was too late. 
 
On that moment the Zr. Ms. Holland was already moving and the Zr. Ms. Pelikaan 
was already packing. 
 
At the end it was a political decision to no longer extend the operation. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
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Yes, there is some emergency aid rejected. You have to think about more in specific 
means and medicines. Mainly clean water was a dilemma and not all suggested 
solutions were accepted. This was specific applicable to water purification medicines. 
The Haitian authorities indicated that the population woulkd not use those. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
The UN carried out a big need assessment. In which they identified several 
shortcomings and there was still a lot of money needed to meet the shortages. 
Till six weeks after the disaster clean drinking water was still not available to 
everybody, I had never seen that before. 
 
It would have been nice if The Netherlands had offered the ships for a longer period 
till the UN was able to hire ships by their own. This caused a capacity gap. 
 
We knew exactly where the problems existed. These were charted. The information 
was coming from the areas it selves. This was provided as insight at the several 
levels. 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
Yes, ECHO coordinates in the first instance with local authorities. The coordination 
with the EU members didn’t go well. With the local authorities the coordination went 
relatively well. 
Only the cluster system did not function as it was supposed to. Haiti did not accept 
the cluster system, because of the experience during the earthquake in 2010.. That is 
why it became a sector system, which is actually the same as the cluster system in 
the execution. 
 
A few sectors were activated. It was done at regional and national level and ECHO 
was part of that.  
 
Not every sector was coordinated in an equally good way 
 
The coordination did not work out as well on all fields. It was the intention that the 
Haitian authority decided within the sector and for that the authority was advised by 
the sector ‘commander’. However not every sector handled it in a right way. 
Sometimes the UN did take over in which the respect to Haiti was a long way off. 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
There were some overlaps, but that is always the case. Certainly in the beginning 
there are overlaps and gaps. As you get more insight the gaps will be filled more and 
more and overlaps will occur less. 
 
 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
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The main difference is that in the military organization everything must be ordered. It 
has to be worked out in detail before they start moving. For relief organizations it is 
good enough to have a broader (more vague) order. They start with a ‘roughly’ order 
and they assess on the spot how to handle. 
It is also caused by the nature of the organization. In conflict areas you have to be 
prepared for everything. That’s what the military organization is in for in the first 
instance. 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
There were no problems with the Dutch military, but there were some problems with 
the French military. They offered a water purification unit and gave all their problems 
to the EU to solve, mainly financial. The French even let the EU pay for the gas they 
needed. Normally, a unit of support has to be self sufficient. 
It has a lot to do with the attitude, both parties adopt. If they are open to each 
other’s working methods, it is easier to coordinate. 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
As mentioned before it was varying. My experience was that the WFP (lead of the 
sector logistic) was not showing any initiatives. 
 
For Example: if it was not safe to moor and to hand over the emergency packages, 
we (the Dutch military navy ships) did not do that. We had the representatives of the 
Haitian government on board. And they had to contact the local representatives of 
the non-military relief organization to sort it out. After it was organized on the shore, 
we could moor and hand over the relief goods. 
 
The Colombians did not act in the same way and several times things got out of 
hands. Also convoys of the cluster logistic were ambushed. The sector communicated 
with the local authorities that I was not safe. The authorities replied that the sector 
whould handover the information to them, because then the local authorities could 
make it safe. The sector replied that they were not willing to share the information 
with the local authorities, because they did not trust them. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
On Haiti it was varying. Some actions were nice and sometimes it could have been 
much better. As ECHO we had a whole catalogue of lessons learned. In the first 
instance the organization of ECHO in the ‘homeland’ should have more confidence in 
the organization on the spot and they should not occupy themselves with 
micromanagement. 
 
In this mission the coordination between the Red Cross and the military organization 
went well. Maybe we should operate more in this way in the ‘safer’ areas without 
have repercussions. This has to be worked out in which case it is possible or not. 
 
In the Caribbean we should make better arrangements about emergency relief in 
regard with hurricanes, because we are situated in the hurricane area. This time it 
was Haiti and the next time it is going to be Saba or Saint Martin. Every year we have 
the same situation. On this moment we are not planning for the required capacities. 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
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Yes, I am familiar with the total costs of the emergency relief from the EU. 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
There are different ways it is funded.  
On one hand it is financed by the ‘membership’ of the EU members. That is for 
personnel, etc. 
The relief goods and relief service are mainly donated and the transport costs are 
compensated for 85% by the EU. 
The French were transported on our costs. 
The Scandinavian team that builds the camps were compensated partial by us and by 
the UN. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
Especialy the distribution of goods could have been more efficient. 
 
The deployment was very good. Not a discordant note was heard from Haiti. 
 
There was no coordination between the Dutch and the French military organizations. 
They had two total different orders, so coordination was not necessary. They did 
exchange information. 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
Preferably as little as possible. 
I have two reasons for that: 
 
It all has to do with the attitude and behaviour. The Dutch military contribution was 
characterized by the very open and cooperative contribution, but often we, as civil 
parties, are brushed aside by military organizations. That is not always as efficient as 
they expect. If military organizations want to focus more on emergency relief, they 
will have to understand more of the civilian ‘relief’ world. 
 
A lot of not-military organizations are dependent on the goodwill of the involved 
parties. However if we are not seen as neutral (because we are coordinating with 
military organizations) we run more risked as wished. Not always in the country 
where the relief operation is executed, but in other countries where the not-military 
organization is also helping. There are moments your life depends on being seen as 
neutral. 
 
We learned from Haiti that in some areas we can be more flexible and we have to 
assess the areas where it is not possible to coordinate with military organizations. 
 
There was an incident with an operation of the Colombian military organization, which 
costed two lives. It is not clear where the bullets were coming from, but the weapons 
have been used at that moment. 
That caused a relative unrest in that area for a couple of days. At that time, it was 
not possible to render emergency relief over there. 
 
8.2. Do you have any last comments/remarks and/or additional comments? 
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For the military organization, it is a good idea to consider in advance what to take 
with you. It seemed they really threw everything on the ship what they could find 
right away. 
 
We, as in The Netherlands, have not thought about having emergency relief goods in 
stock and what you can distribute from there. The United Kingdom has thought about 
it and now they have goods available from stock. 
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7.8 Interview with representative of Ministry of Defence 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2009). 
 
Interview with LTZ1 Clemens Buter, N5/N7 of the Naval Commander of the Caribbean 
(CZSCarib). 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
Initially, I was lead planner of this disaster relief operation. As N5/N7, I am 
responsible for the operational year planning. In this role, I am also responsible for 
organizing the yearly hurricane emergency aid exercises on the windward islands. For 
the help on Haiti, I made the planning for deployment, until the moment that I flew 
to Haiti. I flew (alone) with a coastguard airplane. Normally, the preference is to fly in 
an advance party, but this time I was send alone. The first time that I flew above 
Haiti, I had no permission to land on Haiti from the Dutch Government. The next day 
I flew again towards Haiti, and this time I got permission to leave the plane. Both 
flights gave me a good view on the damage that Matthew had caused west of the line 
Les Cayes - Jeremy. 
So, I was the first on the scene and my role was to coordinate with the national 
authorities and the non-military relief organizations in the area. I tried to coordinate 
the deployment of the Dutch military units. Haiti had a national coordination centre, 
supported by the UN OCHA UNDAC team and the WFP (normally the lead of cluster 
logistics. But the government of Haiti did not want to call it the cluster system, so it 
was called sector) and other organizations. Together with the WFP we coordinated 
our support. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
In an early stage, I had contact with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). I 
am familiar with this organization from my contact with them in 2015 after hurricane 
Erika on Dominica. This organization asked me if we could help and with what 
capacity we could support the operation. Then PAHO requested, in accordance with 
the Haitian Minister of Health, via the Prime Minister, for help. This request was sent 
via the Dutch Consul and the ambassador (at the Dominican Republic). This proved to 
be the wrong way, because the government of Haiti had to send the request to the 
Emergency Response Coordination Cell of the EU in Brussel. The initial request went 
wrong. After this delay, the request was done properly. The delay was painful, 
because it is about emergency relief aid. This can cost lives. The coordination 
between the several organizations went well, but it should have started earlier. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
As mentioned before, there was already an informal request. But the Dutch Ministry 
of Defence didn’t give permission. Finally, the Ministry of Defence received the official 
request for help on the 4th of October. 
 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
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On the informal request, the Dutch Ministry of Defence didn’t react. And the official 
request took a long time. This had to do with the permission of the different involved 
organizations (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN, the EU and of 
course the government of Haiti). 
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
The question can better be what we may not do. We could not get relief and 
supporting goods without the approval of the EU. The Navy ships may not steam up 
to Haiti before the approval. This was also the reason that I was not allowed to get 
out of the airplane the first time. I could fly to Haiti, because it was an Aruban 
airplane. I may not leave the plane, because as Dutch soldier I was not allowed to 
step on the territory of Haiti. This had to do with the permission from EU, UN Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Haiti. There had to be a ‘note verbale’. 
It should be a good thing when the ‘advance party’ could go to the location on time 
and connect with the UNDAC team. Than it is possible to tune up and coordinate the 
emergency support. There is a lot to win in the planning stage 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
There was a need for ships (transport capacity) and little vessels to conduct 
humanitarian operation from sea. With these capacity the unreachable parts of Haiti 
(via road) could be reached. The request was adjusted with the available capacities. 
The Dutch military organization could send two ships, but also engineering capacity 
for reconstruct the infrastructure. The engineers repaired an hospital, and the 
marines conducted force protection. 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
We assessed what was really needed. The roads were damaged. The tensions in Haiti 
became stronger and convoys (on land) were raided. There was an urgent need for 
transport capacity on sea and by air. We, the Dutch military, had no helicopter 
capacity. Normally we have helicopter capacity on board of our ships, but not on this 
moment. Gladly, the USA delivered these capacities. We had the unique transport 
capacity with our Navy ships, Fast Raiding Interception and Special Forces Crafts 
(FRISCs), little zodiacs and a handmade ponton. This ponton could help us to unload 
relief aid goods on locations without a good shore.  
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
There was no MoU, but there was a ‘note verbale’. Only, it took a while before it was 
ready, signed and in place. 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
I did not know the term Oslo Guidelines. I took an e-course of the UN OCHA to get 
familiar with the procedures and ‘who is who’ within the ‘humanitarian community’. 
This e-course was not mandatory, but it should be. In my function as LO 
(coordinating with all involved organization), no additional education or course was 
needed. 
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3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
These guidelines were not leading for my function as LO. 
When I arrived at the scene, I was appointed to be a CMCOORD in UNDAC. This was 
not my initial assignment. I was told to be the Dutch LO. CMCOORD within 
UNDAC/Haiti had to be more robust, so it was decided that I supported the UNDAC. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
Within the sector system, the WFP can use the Dutch capacity for the logistic tasks. 
The non-military relief organizations delivered the emergency aid goods. Our Navy 
ships could transport these goods to the population in need. We always had a 
representative of the concerning non-military relief organization on-board to 
coordinate the ‘last mile’ distribution. This is to prevent chaos and looting. We only 
coordinated with the well-organized non-military relief organizations. 
 
The only thing is that we started 10 days after hurricane Matthew made landfall on 
Haiti. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
There was contact with the local authorities. Especially for coordination of the 
execution of the emergency relief. This was not always the right way. It was election 
time when the hurricane Matthew made landfall on Haiti. So the distribution of the 
emergency aid could be used as a lobby for the local authority to gain more votes. 
But with the UN UNDAC and the EU, we came to a good distribution of the relief 
goods. With good coordination with all the involved parties, the lobby of the local 
authorities was set off. 
 
On Haiti were two coordinating organizations. The UN OCHA and the EU ECHO. 
Normally this is no problem, but on Haiti the coordination between these 
organizations was not very effective. They did not integrate. Gladly, this did not lead 
to big problems. 
 
I had direct contact with the local authorities, but I always informed both the UN 
OCHA and EU ECHO (the EU paid a part of the emergency aid of the Dutch military 
organization, so they had to be informed). 
Ronald Christiaans was duty team leader of the UN UNDAC. He had direct contact 
with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Normally he works at the police academy in 
Apeldoorn. This makes it possible to coordinate with him in the preparation phase. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
We delivered the relief aid for 2 weeks. 
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5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
The first request was from the PAHO. This was not approved and we could not help, 
because our ships were not allowed to go to Port-au-Prince without any approval. The 
relief goods of PAHO were in Port-au-Prince. Because of this, all their relief goods had 
to be transported via road (with delay). 
 
The delivered emergency support was in accordance with the request. After a week, 
the support was prolonged for another week. After that, the UN and the EU requested 
again for a prolongation. This was to fill the capacity gap, caused by the leaving 
Americans. With their leave, there was an extra need for transport capacity. This 
request was not approved by political reasons. 
 
At operational level, another prolongation was very logic. Only for a few days was 
enough. The WFP needed some days to arrange civil transport ships and civil landings 
ships. It was preferred to had a good hand-over take-over with the civil provider of 
transport capacity. But on strategic level the decision was made that the support had 
to stop. 
 
On the operational level, this decision felt a bit strange. The support is for the local 
population, but it felt more like showing the flag (for media attention). There was no 
coordinated between the operational and the strategical level on this issue. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
There was no emergency relief rejected. There was only one difficult situation with 
the Zr. Ms. Pelikaan. With mooring the ship, the reception of the relief goods was not 
very good organized and the sea was very rough.  That combination gave trouble 
with unloading the relief goods. When the unloading takes too much time, the local 
population becomes restless. It resulted in the decision to depart and let the 
representative of the local authority on-board contact the representative local 
authority in the village. They coordinated that the reception had to be better 
organized. This is one of the reason for the Dutch military organization to be armed 
for self-protection. The marines had the instruction to de-escalate and to back down. 
When the situation gets out of hand, they could use their weapons for deterrence and 
self-defence. Unfortunately, there was an article in the newspaper about the situation 
that the Dutch army were not able to moor. This was a bit negative, but with 
coordinating with the local media we prevented it for an eventually next time. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
The Dutch Navy ships came with a lot of transport capacity, people and experience, 
but not with a lot of relief goods. We received the relief goods from the non-military 
relief organizations.  
For the next operation, it is better to take more building material with us. With the 
extra building materials, the engineers could have done more for the local hospital. 
Gladly, a local constructor sponsored with materials. 
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6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
Yes, I coordinated with local authorities and with non-military relief organizations. 
And UN OCHA had the coordinating mechanism with the ‘sectors’ in place. I had 
contact with the WFP (lead of sector logistics) and with the UNDAC. I also coordinated 
with Colombians (a Colombian ship was in the Colombian harbour) and US units 
(Joint Task Force (JTF) Matthew). 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
In the beginning, the WFP (lead of the sector logistics) did not exactly know which 
military and non-military relief organizations were on Haiti to support the emergency 
response operation. At that moment, there could be overlap with capacities. But after 
a short period, the WFP coordinated all the actors (which wanted to be coordinated). 
All the military and non-military relief organization had to register and the WFP 
coordinated their relief actions (within the sector logistics). OCHA was in charge of 
the registration. 
 
In 2010, after the earthquake, Haiti was taken over by the relief organizations. And 
that was something that Haiti did not want during the relief operation after Matthew. 
The government of Haiti wanted to be in charge. That was the reason that the cluster 
concept of UN OCHA was not in place. Instead of the cluster concept, the Haitian 
authorities were in charge of the sector concept. And UN OCHA advised them. 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
We also coordinated with the International Federation of the Red Cross. Normally 
they do not coordinate with military organizations. But the coordination was very 
effective. 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
The CMCOORD should have be more robust. 
 
Besides that, the command & control (C2) construction in the military organization 
was difficult. I was sent to Haiti to assess the priorities for the military headquarter. 
The headquarter send this information to the commanders of the Dutch Naval ships. 
The commander of the relief operation was the commander of the Zr. Ms. Holland. 
This gave some problems in the beginning, because it was a bit bureaucratic. And the 
local authorities and representatives of the non-military relief organizations on board 
of the ships had different views on the situation than I had at the scene. After a while 
it went better because we made some clear agreements. In the future it is better to 
assign an ‘on-scene commander’ or bring out an direct liaison officer to the scene. 
The line of sight has to be as short as possible for relief operations.  
This all lead to contacts with local authorities and non-military relief organizations. 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
I had daily contact with the US JTF Matthew (they were located on the airport of Port-
au-Prince) and I just walked to the Colombian Navy ship. 
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As said before, the communication (and coordination) was a bit difficult in the 
beginning. But later on it went very well. 
 
The coordination with the local authorities and the non-military relief organizations 
went very good and effective. Only the coordination within the military organization 
could have been better. Also the organization of the CMCOORD has to be more robust. 
That can result in a more effective organization of the emergency relief operation. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
The emergency relief went very well. The main ‘lesson learned’ of this operations is 
that we have to send an ‘advance party’ before the disaster occurs (if possible) or as 
fast as possible after the disaster to make a good needs assessment. We also have to 
coordinate as fast as possible with the local authorities and non-military relief 
organizations after the disaster to get situational awareness. 
 
What also helps, is to enlarge the knowledge of the military planners for disaster 
relief operations. I now work for the PAHO and try to organise a symposium on 
Curacao with all the key players within the disaster (humanitarian) relief community.  
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
No, I am not familiar with the costs of the operation. I only know the costs of the 
relief goods and aid we delivered. 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
This is financed by the EU. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
The EU also coordinated a French water purification unit in Haiti. This French unit had 
no transport capacity. And we had transport capacity, but we may not use the 
vehicles to support the French. I tried to arrange the coordination with the French 
unit via the EU, but unfortunately this was not successful.  
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
We are an indispensable faction in the Caribbean. And we have unique capacities. 
This is transport capacity, ‘force protection’ capacity (the marines), engineering 
capacity and also our medical specialists and mental help organization. With this 
capacity we can make the difference. We can also support (humanitarian) relief 
operations from sea and on land.  
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7.9 Interview with representative of the International Federation 
of the Red Cross 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organisations (SIPRI,2006). 
 
Interview with Stephan McAndrew, Head of operations IFRC in Haiti. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation 
(Hurricane Matthew)? 
 
Head of Operations of the International Federation of Red Cross 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
Yes. Haitian Red Cross requested support to international red cross 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request 
for help? 
 
Immediately on the 4th of October. 
 
2.3. How did your organisation react/respond to it? 
 
Large scale operation. Food, health, water, shelter, first aid,  
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the 
disaster area and how long did it take to get there? 
 
Some items were prepositioned. Others sent from neighbouring countries. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
Human, financial and in kind resources. 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment?   
 
Yes, we did a needs assessment. 
 
3.2. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines?   
 
Yes. 
 
3.3. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the cooperation/coordination with the 
(Dutch) military organisation?   
 
I believe so, but I am not sure. 
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4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was 
this help/assistance in place? 
 
Red Cross assistance. Food, non food items and equipment. 
 
4.2. Did your organisation have direct contact with the Haitian (local) 
authorities or was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
It was both direct and indirect via other organisations, such as UN OCHA and EU 
ECHO. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
We are still delivering now. The items shipped by Dutch navy were immediately 
distributed. 
 
5.2. Was this conform the request for help or was it for a longer/shorter period? 
 
Yes, it was conform the request. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of 
the rejection? 
 
The services from the Red Cross are not rejected. But the Red Cross receives many 
offers all the time, which are not appropriate. So we reject those offers 
 
5.4. Was your organisation able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of 
were there some assets/goods not available? 
 
No, we were not able to provide all the requested help. International Red Cross 
appeal is currently 40% supported. 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for cooperating and/or coordinating 
your efforts with other providing countries, international agencies or the 
recipient country? 
 
Yes. UN coordination systems, cluster system, UNDAC/OCHA. But not all systems 
were activated by the Government of Haiti. 
 
6.2. Was the help/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organisations 
complementary or were they is some cases dubbel? 
 
Generally complimentary. 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the cooperation/coordination with the 
(Dutch) military organisation and a humanitarian aid organisation? 
 
Yes. The Dutch military is a military with history in the region. Red Cross and other 
organizations are neutral and protected under Geneva Conventions. 
 84 
 
6.4. Where there any problems with the cooperation/coordination with the 
(Dutch) military organisation? 
 
Generally no. The support from Dutch navy was very good and timely. 
 
6.5. How effective was this cooperating and/or coordinating mechanisms and 
why? 
 
Because of not full activation the coordination was not optimal. 
 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/where 
the ‘lessons learned’? 
 
Standardized Real Time Evaluations, and other reviews. 
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
Yes. 
 
7.2. How was it funded? 
 
Donors. Currently still underfunded. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
cooperation/coordination with the (Dutch) military organisation? 
 
Cost / Benefit and reputational risk using military assets. 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organisation during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
They can provide some support, such as heavy list, or logistics support, but they are 
not humanitarians. 
 
8.2. Do you have any last comments/remarks? 
 
The Pelican support was very good. Support from Dutch Military was excellent. 
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7.10 Interview with representative of Ministry of Defence 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2006). 
 
Interview with KTZ Bas Dijkhuizen, commander of the Zr. Ms. Holland, naval ship of the 
Dutch Ministry of Defence. 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I was commander of the Zr. Ms. Holland. One of the two Dutch Navy ships that 
supported Haiti after the hurricane Matthew. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
Direct after the occurrence of the hurricane, the Haitian Ministry of Health requested 
help of the Dutch Navy ships via the UN World Health Organization (WHO). This was 
because of the good experience with the help of these ships after the earthquake in 
2010. This request went from the UN via the EU to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
The staff of the Naval Commander Netherlands Caribbean (COMNLCARIB) knew about 
the request and started to prepare the units for assistance after the hurricane. These 
preparations started on the 4th of October. The support after a hurricane in the 
Caribbean area is one of the main tasks of the Dutch military organization. The 
reasons is that the Caribbean is in the hurricane risk area for the period from August 
till November. 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
Just as the staff of COMNLCARIB, we started our preparations for assistance. We 
made an assessment of the needs based on experience with helping after hurricanes 
in the region.  
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
We made a good estimation of what the exact role the Dutch military organization 
would be. On this estimation, we took different capacities and relief goods on board 
of the supporting ships. Little vessels for distribution, marines for security, extra 
medical capacity, an Hydrographic team and engineers for repairing infrastructure. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
Transport capacity for the distribution of water, food, medicines, hygiene goods and 
building. 
 
3. Appropriateness 
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3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
We only made an own assessment for the survey of a hospital in Les Cayes. During 
the rest of the operation, we were performing strategic transport and distribution of 
the goods from Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
A ‘note verbale’ was signed between Haiti and the Netherlands. This meant that we 
were exempted from clearing goods and we may operate armed on Haiti  
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
Yes, I am familiar with these guidelines. 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
No, they were not leading. Locally, we coordinated with the WFP and the 
representatives of the Haitian government to find the best way to distribute the relief 
goods. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
The main task of the Dutch military was the distribution of relief goods, such as water, 
food, medicines, hygiene products an building material, to the heavy affected areas 
that were not reachable via road. The roads were damaged by the hurricane. 
The ‘last mile’ distribution was executed by the local representatives of the non-
military relief organizations or the local authorities. 
The Dutch Navy ships took care of distributing the goods from Port-au-Prince and Les 
Cayes to the affected areas on the west coast. 
When the shore was secured and a safe distribution place was established, the relief 
goods were transported from the ships to the coast with little vessels. 
In most of the times there were scaffolds available. From this place, we handover the 
relief goods to the non-military relief organizations or local authorities.  
Without securing these places by the marines, there would be chaos and unsafe 
situations. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
We often had contact with local authorities or with local representatives of the non-
military relief organizations. We also took representatives of the Haitian government 
and the non-military relief organizations on board of the Navy ships. They had 
contact with the local authorities and local representatives of the non-military 
organizations on the locations where we had to distribute the relief goods. This 
method helped to coordinate orderly with the involved parties.  
 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
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5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
The Zr. Ms. Holland supported for 14 days. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
The first assignment was for one week, but is was prolonged for another week. 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
No, there was no relief support rejected. 
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the second request for prolonging 
another week. The international relief support was in place. International non-military 
relief organizations could use their own transport means to distribute their relief 
goods to the affected areas. The transport means of the Dutch military organization 
was not needed anymore. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
The Zr. Ms. Holland and the Zr. Ms. Pelikaan were very good suited to execute the 
requested assignments. The Navy ships could distribute the affected areas, which 
couldn’t be reached by road, from see with little vessels. Some hundreds of tons relief 
goods were distributed in this way.  
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
The Dutch military organization had a Liaison Officer (LO) in Port-au-Prince, who 
coordinated with the non-military relief organizations directly and via UN OCHA. 
We were part of the logistic sector, which was led by the Haitian government and 
helped by the World Food Programme. 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
There was some overlap in assistance, but also complementary to each other. 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
No answer 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
No, we almost had no coordination problems on our level. There was only one 
situation that the location was not safe, because the local authority and/or 
representative of the non-military relief organisation were not informed or too late 
with the organization of receiving the relief goods. 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
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The coordination via the LO in Port-au-Prince was very effective. The coordination via 
the WFP was good, but many non-military relief organizations had their own agenda 
en operated on their own. 
 
The relief support was effective, because we asked representatives of the government 
and the non-military relief organizations on board of the ships. In that way we could 
coordinate with them and they can coordinate with their contacts in the affected 
areas. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
See 6.5 
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
Yes, I am familiar with the costs. 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
Partly by the UE and partly by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
The operation was effective and efficiently. 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
The military organization has a lot of means and capacity. With good coordination 
between the military organization and the non-military organization, the military 
organization can make the difference. In this case the military organizations were the 
only ones who had the capacity for transport and distribution via the sea. 
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7.11 Interview with representative of Ministry of Defence 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations. 
 
Interview with LTZ1 Menno van der Eerden, commander of the Zr. Ms. Pelikaan.  
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
I was commander of the Zr. Ms. Pelikaan. And we supported the disaster relief 
operation with transport capacity. 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
Yes. At first, the government of Haiti send the request for help via the UN and later 
via the EU and the EU requested The Netherlands. In the request Haiti asked 
especially for the Z. Ms. Pelikaan, because of the positive experience during the 
support in the Caribbean (Haiti earthquake in 2010, Dominica hurricane in 2015), and 
their unique capacity. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
I was notified directly after Haiti send the request for help. But we got the order to 
support a week later than the request was send. 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
 
At first, the Ministry of Defence and the Naval Commander of the Caribbean had to 
wait until the request was accepted. The EU-regulations forbid explicit to send 
support before the approval. We even may not start with pre-positioning the ship. So, 
we only made general preparations and had to wait till we could go to Haiti.  
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
The politicians had to give permission. This meant that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
had to negotiate with the EU, so that the support would be financed by the EU.  
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
We needed all the available assets to offer emergency relief aid to save lives and to 
help the local authorities. We supported with the Z. Ms. Pelikaan to deliver transport 
capacity and we had distribution vessels and we supported with force protection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
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3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
The combination of many NGOs on the spot without central coordination, a weak 
government and bad infrastructure and communication caused that we got an 
assessment of needs several days after our arrival in the region. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
No, there was no MoU with Haiti. This was one of the reasons we operated from sea 
without a specific land component. 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
No, I am not familiar with the Oslo Guidelines. 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
I don’t know. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
After about ten days after the occurrence of hurricane Matthew, we were in the 
vicinity of Haiti. Our emergency relief aid was distribution of relief goods (food, 
shelterkits, etc.). 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
 
Yes, I had direct contact with local authorities. I took local authorities and 
representatives of non-military relief organizations on board of the Zr. Ms. Pelikaan. I 
did this with the 3D concept (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) in mind. We 
were literally stuck with each other. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
We assisted for three and a half weeks. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
At first, we delivered support for one week. But this was prolonged with another week. 
And the second request for prolongation was rejected.  
 
 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
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Yes, the second request for prolongation was rejected. It was an estimation of the 
higher command that after two weeks it was not immediate response support 
anymore, but just normal help. 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
Yes, we were able to provide all the requested help. 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
There was a lot of coordination with non-military relief organizations and limited 
coordination with other countries. That contact was more the exchange of information. 
The contact was direct with the involved organizations or via our Liaison Officer in 
Port-au-Prince (Clemens Buter). 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
There was overlap of support. In Haiti were a lot of non-military relief organizations 
active, and all with their own agenda. The Haitian government coordinated and the 
World Food Programme (UN) assisted the coordination. Despite the central 
coordination, there were some non-military relief organization that did their own 
business.  
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
In my opinion, there is no any difference in coordination in this case. 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
No, the coordination went well. Of course, in the beginning you have to get used to 
each other and you have to find out which role the different organizations have. 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
 
The coordination was very effective, because of the short communication and 
coordination lines. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
This was a very useful mission that certainly was for the best of a large number of 
affected people. The most important ‘lessons learned’ are the slow (political) decision 
that is not supporting the speed of the emergency relief mission. Another 
(intern) ’lessons learned’ is flattening the command and control structure and placing 
the responsible and decision authority on operational level. 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
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About €750.000,- 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
By the EU. 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
Excellent. Much “value for money”. 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
Military organizations feature a lot of unique characteristics (in a short period deploy 
a lot of people in inaccessible places with unique means and be able to protect this) 
which are suitable for emergency relief aid. It is logical that military organizations are 
used for this and it is our social task (as military organization for the community). We 
should limit it in emergency relief aid on places where the safety is not threatened. 
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7.12 Interview with representative of Ministry of Defence 
 
The following questions are based on the aspects of effectiveness within the disaster 
relief operations by military organizations (SIPRI, 2009). 
 
Interview with Sgt1 Frank Jonker, Group commander within the 111 Armored 
Engenieerscompagny of 43 Mechanised Brigade 
 
1. Opening 
 
1.1. Could you describe your role in the Haiti disaster response operation (Hurricane 
Matthew)? 
 
My role during the emergency relief on Haiti was group commander of the engineers. 
My tasks were: 
 Select the engineer group for the emergency aid. 
 Select the materials and the tools 
 Advise the commander of the Zr. Ms. Holland with engineer’s experience 
 Advise the commander Task Team Emergency aid 
 Attend the command of every assignment of the Task Team Emergency ais 
 Lead the engineers group 
 Attend and lead the ‘force protection’ 
 Lead the recovery of the infrastructure (recovery of the road and a hospital) 
 Help with the distribution of emergency relief goods 
 
 
2. Timeliness 
 
2.1. Was there a request for help formulated and where did it came from 
(country/UN)? 
 
My engineers group was under command of the ‘Compagnie in the West’, stationed 
on the Naval base Parera. Besides of the normal programme we had as task to 
support during disaster relief operations. 
 
When hurricane Matthew came to Haiti, the first contact were made for a possible 
deployment. We had to check all the needed materials for a deployment. At first, 
when the hurricane made not landfall on Curacao and Bonaire, we stopped the 
preparations. 
 
But short after that, we heard that we would be deployed at Haiti. On that moment, 
two ships of the Dutch Navy were already in the region. The Zr. Ms. Holland and the 
Zr. Ms. Pelikaan. 
We made the first preparations before the actual request, but we had to wait for the 
approval to go to Haiti. 
 
2.2. How soon after the occurrence of the disaster did you receive the request for help? 
 
As part of the ‘Compagny in the West’, we made a capacity availability schema. It 
was direct clear that the infantry was not needed. Marines would do the force 
protection. But engineers were needed for the reconstruction of the infrastructure. 
We boarded on the 6th of October. 
 
 
 
 
2.3. How did your organization react/respond to it? 
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Adequate, but we had to take into account that we would not deploy. The approval on 
the request of Haiti took a long time. Some said that there wouldn’t be an emergency 
relief operation, because most of the affected people would die within 2 weeks after 
the occurrence on the disaster.  
 
2.4. What actions were needed to get the necessary assets/goods in the disaster area 
and how long did it take to get there? 
 
We needed tools and materials for the reconstruction activities. We made an 
assessment to indicate the needs. 
Several contractors on Curacao and Aruba donated wood and shelters. 
Some non-military relief organizations (e.g. the International Federation of the Red 
Cross) distributed food and emergency aid packages. 
 
2.5. Which assets/goods were needed for the help/assistance/operation? 
 
No answer 
 
 
3. Appropriateness 
 
3.1. Did you conduct any sort of needs assessment? 
 
Our higher command made an assessment. We made an own assessment on location 
(in Les Cayes and several little villages) during social patrols. So we heard and saw 
the needed for the reconstruction activities. We made reports and shared this with 
other units. 
 
3.2. Was there a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of any kind in place with the 
country in which the emergency aid was conducted in case of legal liability? 
 
No answer 
 
3.3. Are you familiar with the Oslo Guidelines? 
 
No, I am not 
 
3.4. Were the Oslo Guidelines leading in the coordination (with the Dutch military 
forces or with the non-military organization)? 
 
I don’t know. 
 
 
4. Absorptive capacity 
 
4.1. What type of help/assistance did your organisation deliver and when was this 
help/assistance in place? 
 
We reconstructed infrastructure, such as roofs and some rooms of an hospital in Les 
Cayes. We conducted several beach landings for distribution of food and emergency 
aid packages. 
We did an reconnaissance for moor possibilities and we put these data in a chart and 
reports. 
 
4.2. Did your organization have direct contact with the Haitian (local) authorities or 
was it channelled through other agencies/organisations? 
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We worked closely with the non-military relief organizations. These organizations had 
contact with the Haitian government and the affected but not yet helped villages. 
Before we came in action, we had contact with the non-military relief organizations to 
coordinate our activities with them. 
 
 
5. Efficiency 
 
5.1. For how long did your organisation deliver the help/assistance? 
 
I helped from the 6th till 27th of October. 
 
5.2. Was the emergency aid in accordance with the request or did it take 
longer/shorter? 
 
No answer 
 
5.3. Was there any help/assistance rejected? And if so, what was the reason of the 
rejection? 
 
No answer 
 
5.4. Was your organization able to provide all the requested help/assistance? Of were 
there some assets/goods not available? 
 
No answer 
 
 
6. Coordination 
 
6.1. Were there any mechanisms in place for coordinating your efforts with other 
providing countries, international agencies or the recipient country? 
 
Yes, there were mechanisms. On operational level, we coordinated with the 
Americans, the Russians and Canadian military units. We also coordinated a lot with 
the international non-military relief organizations. 
 
6.2. Was the help/support/assistance of the different humanitarian aid organizations 
complementary or did they in some cases overlap? 
 
No answer 
 
6.3. Is there any difference between the coordination with the (Dutch) military 
organization and a humanitarian aid/relief organization? 
 
No answer 
 
6.4. Were there any problems with the coordination with the (Dutch military or non-
military) organization? 
 
No answer 
 
 
 
6.5. How effective was the coordination in your opinion? 
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This coordination was effective enough. And there were no language barriers. 
 
6.6. How do you evaluate the contribution of help/assistance? What are/were the 
‘lessons learned’? 
 
My personal opinion: 
 
I think that there was too much attention for the national and social media. This gave 
me the feeling that we could have done more than we have done.  
Also the choices for the villages that had to be distributed were discussable. Some 
villages were distributed more than once and other villages got not enough 
emergency aid goods for the whole population. This escalated in little riots. This gave 
me the feeling of corruption. 
 
 
7. Costs 
 
7.1. Are you familiar with the costs of this disaster relief operation? 
 
No answer 
 
7.2. Do you know how it was funded? 
 
No answer 
 
7.3. How do you evaluate the efficiency of the operation when you focus on the 
coordination with the (Dutch military or non-military) organization? 
 
No answer 
 
 
8. Concluding 
 
8.1. What is your personal opinion on the role of a military organization during 
disaster relief operations? 
 
As the Dutch military organization we contributed to the emergency relief support for 
Haiti after the hurricane Matthew. On the other side, I still have the feeling that we 
could have done more. It took a lot of time to secure the surroundings of the 
distribution locations. This was for our own safety, but also for the safety of the non-
military relief organizations. In every villages was another atmosphere. We had to 
adjust our plans in relation to the security. And we may not operate during the 
evening and the night, when it was dark. That cost a lot of precious time. 
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7.13 After Action Review OCHA 
After-Action Review (AAR) for the Hurricane Response in Haiti: 
Humanitarian-Military-Police Interaction and the Use of Foreign 
Military Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)  
 
 
Background: 
 Hurricane Matthew struck Haiti on 4 October, leaving an estimated 1.4 million Haitians in need 
of humanitarian assistance. Main challenges for humanitarian response were limited funding, 
physical access to affected populations and a spat of security incidents. 
 The Hurricane coincided with the run for the legislative and presidential elections.  
 Following the activation of the National Emergency Operations Centre (COUN), the 
Government of Haiti through the Minister of Planning and External Cooperation, officially 
requested the assistance of the international community to support the response. From the 
outset of the emergency and in line with its primary role, the Government of Haiti clearly 
established its leadership of the coordination of the international response.(1)  
 The Netherlands, Canada and the US deployed military assets during the first month of the 
response to support humanitarian efforts. The coordination was established ad hoc by the 
UNDAC team. UNDAC members also established “convoy security cells” in les Cayes and 
Jeremie to streamline the requests for escorts between requesters (mostly humanitarian 
organisations) and providers (the police and military components of the MINUSTAH and 
HNP). Other limited assets were deployed on a short term basis, upon bilateral agreement 
with the Haitian government (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela). 
 UNDAC deployed a CMCoord Officer (MCDA request through CANADEM) two weeks after 
the hurricane, for two weeks, in support of the regular OCHA CMCoord FP. 
 An ERR CMCoord Officer arrived 4 weeks after the hurricane, as a support to the regular 
OCHA CMCoord FP for 6 weeks. A month after the hurricane struck, the core activities of the 
mission consisted in implementing proper coordination mechanisms between humanitarians 
and MINUSTAH in the use of escorts and look at alternatives to ensure proper security for 
transport and distribution of humanitarian assistance in PaP and field hubs. A crucial aspect 
was also to reaffirm OCHA’s role in civil-military coordination. In field hubs, UNDAC / ERR 
team members (HAO) ensured the coordination of escorts during the whole response.  
 
Survey objectives:  
 Discuss the lessons learned from the humanitarian – military – police coordination as part of 
the first two months of the emergency response and agree on a way forward to address some 
of the identified challenges; 
 Increase the understanding of the views around the use of armed escorts and alternatives; 
 Discuss the relevance of the UN-CMCoord guidelines (i.e. Haiti Guidelines / IASC guidelines 
on the use of armed escorts) and platforms in place before and during the response.  
 
Methodology 
 A Survey link (Survey Monkey) with close-ended questions was sent to national / international 
actors who were involved in the civil – military coordination in the first two months of the 
response (mainly related to the use or provision of armed escorts).
2
  
Responders 
 Targeted actors were humanitarian, military, police officers 
and government officials involved in the first two months of 
the response. Sixteen individuals filled the questionnaire. 
UN agencies were the mostly represented, followed by 
MINUSTAH military component. One NGO / one 
representative of the civil component of MINUSTAH and no 
government official took the survey.  
 Provided the low diversity in the responders’profiles, the 
                                           
1
 UNDAC Haiti EOM report, nov. 2016 
2
 Survey can be found at : https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/HaitiHurricanMatthewAARonCMCoord  
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results only provide general indications of perception of civil-military coordination during the 
first two months of the Matthew response.  
 The limited number of participants prevents from drawing conclusions but provide at least 
indications on the perception of the context.  
 
 
Key findings:  
 The 2013 Guidelines for civil-military coordination in Haiti are mostly perceived relevant but a 
better operational understanding by relevant actors would have benefitted the response; 
 OCHA UN-CMCoord Officers should have been deployed right before the hurricane, or at 
least very early at the first stage of the response for more impact; 
 A majority of responders consider that MCDA procedures were clearly defined;  
 Polarization of opinions dividing militaries and humanitarians, in particular on the 
security context and on the relevance in the use of military escorts; 
 The lack of agreement on the use of armed escorts to facilitate access in the South and 
Grande Anse Department reflects the disagreements amongst (humanitarian) actors in the 
field that generated an uneven use of armed escorts.  
  
Ways forward:  
1. Preparedness:  
 CMCoord must be better integrated in preparedness (with COUN / DPC, JOC and HCT), so 
mechanisms could be even more rapidly activated in case of an emergency; 
 Increase the operational understanding of Haiti humanitarian civil-military Guidelines by all 
actors (and in particular humanitarians / national authorities) as part of the preparedness 
efforts;  
 Additional humanitarian CMCoord capacity should be in place in country, ready to respond to 
emergencies when deemed relevant; 
 Local humanitarian CMCoord platforms should be reinforced as part of the preparedness 
efforts; 
● Humanitarian actors / national authorities to increase engagement with communities before 
and during emergency; 
 
2. Response:  
 Increase UN-CMCoord capacity at the beginning of the operations at national (JOC / HCT) 
and local level (local UN-CMCoord platforms, AHCT); 
 Consistent and coherent platforms must be implemented during the first phase of the 
emergency at local level;  
 Increase inclusion of the national authorities (primary CMCood interlocutor) prior, during and 
after responses;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey analysis:  
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a. Guidance:  
 Guidelines for Civil Military Coordination in Haiti 
is still perceived relevant (69%), but according 
to the sample (MINUSTAH and non-
MINUSTAH responders), the MINUSTAH 
personnel have the best operational 
understanding of all actors present (followed by 
humanitarian actors and then only local 
authorities). The majority of participants 
somehow/completely agree with the fact that a 
better operational understanding of the 
guidelines by responding organisations would 
have benefitted the whole response. 
 
b. Humanitarian CMCoord Capacity and Platforms 
 There is a lack of agreement on the appropriate level 
of humanitarian CMCoord capacity in country (right 
place, right time), before the emergency and during the 
first two months. However, responders consider that 
additional CMCoord capacity should have been 
deployed just prior the hurricane. 
 There is a lack of agreement on the fact that the 
appropriate platform was in place before the hurricane, 
but participants mostly agree upon the 
appropriateness of the additional CMCoord platforms 
activated during the first two months of the emergency.   
 More participants agree with the affirmation that there 
is a sustained dialogue between MINUSTAH / HNP 
and humanitarian actors at national and field level. 
Interesting to note that military personnel from the 
MINUSTAH tend to agree more with that statement than representatives of the UN or INGOs. 
 
c. Use of MCDA to Support Humanitarian Activities 
 The majority of responders consider there was a 
clearly defined set of procedures in requesting for 
MCDA in place before the hurricane (although a 
significant number of participants do not have an 
opinion), and even more during the response 
operations.  
 Similarly, the majority of participants consider there is a 
common understanding of the concept of “last resort”.  
 Participants mostly consider there has been a 
consistent and coherent approach among humanitarian 
organizations on the use of MCDA to support 
humanitarian activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. Access and Security 
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 There is no agreement on insecurity being the main access issue in South and Grande Anse 
Departments. Those who agree with the statement are representatives of the MINUSTAH 
military component or from UN agencies, while those who disagree from INGO / UN agency. 
 No agreement either on the statement that the use of armed escorts is the appropriate 
strategy for safe access, although a significant number of participants (6) – mostly from the 
military component of the MINSUTAH - completely agree with the statement.  
 Similarly, opinions are polarized when it comes to agreeing with the statement that 
humanitarian actors have taken all possible measures/ alternatives to enable safe access to 
communities. Personnel from the military component of MINUSTAH seem to agree with the 
statement, while NGO, and most UN representatives to disagree.  
 A significant number of responders (9/16) consider that the main causes of insecurity are not 
well understood by humanitarian actors nor that they are addressed appropriately.  
 Most actors think that security measures offered by MINUSTAH and HNP are not appropriate.  
 
e. Use of escorts  
 Views on the coherence and consistency in the use of armed escorts by humanitarian actors 
varies a lot (no agreement). The perception of the operational understanding of the IASC 
Guidelines by all actors show similar results.  
 To the statement: HNP / MINUSTAH escorts provide a credible deterrent necessary to 
enhance the safety of humanitarian personnel and capacity to provide assistance to the 
people-in-need without compromising their security and/or those of the affected people:  
Responders tend to think that MINUSTAH escorts were more efficient than HNP ones, while 
in facts, convoys escorted by at least one HNP component were less subjected to attacks 
than those escorted by MINUSTAH, in particular BRABAT only, as regularly attacked
3
.  
 All responders from MINUSTAH military component (4) agree with statement 25 and disagree 
with statement 26. 
 The majority of responders (10/16) consider that there is a clear set of procedures for 
requesting armed escorts.  
 
 
 
 
                                           
3 Data JOC on incidents  
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7.14 Situation updates Logistic Cluster 
 
See PDF Annexes 7.14 – 7.18. 
 
7.15 ECHO crisis appeal 
 
See PDF Annexes 7.14 – 7.18. 
 
7.16 Flash appeal Haiti 
 
See PDF Annexes 7.14 – 7.18. 
 
7.17 Concept of Operation of Logistic Working Group 
 
See PDF Annexes 7.14 – 7.18. 
 
7.18 OCHA situation report 
 
See PDF Annexes 7.14 – 7.18. 
